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The Laws of War and
The Angolan Trial of Mercenaries:
Death to the Dogs of War
BETWEEN THE 11th and the 19th of June, 1976, the People's
Revolutionary Court of Angola tried and convicted 13 white
soldiers on the charge of being mercenaries, finally sentencing
nine to prison and four to death.' This Note entails an examina-
tion of the circumstances of that trial. The narrow focus here
will be the aspects of procedural and substantive fairness in the
trial, while the broader concern will be the impact of this trial on
the development of the laws of war, particularly as regards the
status of mercenaries under international law.
This is only the beginning of the larger inquiry which the legal
community must undertake. Eventually there should be an ex-
amination of the proper ends of the laws of war and also a more
current determination of the propriety of the means employed in
achieving those ends. The international legal community even
now is realizing its obligation and is beginning to test the aphorism:
"The end of the law is peace. The means to that end is war."2
The world beholds the image of Justice herself struggling, one
upraised arm holding the scales in which she weighs the right,
the other carrying the sword with which she executes it. Within
the context of the Angola trial of mercenaries, this Note attempts
to determine whether opposing rights were fairly weighed, or
whether the cloak of Justice was rent asunder in the execution.
In order to understand the trial, one must know the period
and the place in which it occurred. The following is a brief sum-
mary of the political and military events which preceded the
trial. 3
I ANGOLA: Death for 'Dogs of War', NEWSWEEK, Jul. 12, 1976, at 32.
2 DR. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 1-2 (2nd ed. J. Labor
transl. 1915). The author laments: "So long as the law is compelled to hold
itself in readiness to resist the attacks of wrong . . . it cannot dispense with
war. The life of the law is a struggle . . . of nations, of the state power, of
classes, of individuals ..... " Id.
3See generally Marcum, Lessons of Angola, 54 FOR. AFF. 407 (1976); Ebinger,
External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil
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Twice the size of Texas, with a population of approximately
six million people, Angola is considered to be potentially one of
the richest countries in southwestern Africa. 4  In April 1974,
Portugal's armed forces overthrew the government of Marcello
Caetano and the new government moved steadily in the direc-
tion of independence for Angola, which had been a Portuguese
colony for 500 years. In early 1975, the Portuguese announced
the Alvor Accord under which the three native liberation move-
ments would participate with the Portuguese in a transitional
government that would operate until the outright grant of inde-
pendence on November 11, 1975.5 Having been accorded ex-
clusive political legitimacy by Portugal's new military regime, the
three competing insurgent groups fought for political and military
power.
Each of Angola's three major ethno-linguistic communities had
produced a major liberation movement with a separate army,
separate political structure, and separate sources of external sup-
port.6
The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
is led by Holden Roberto and draws its popular support from
the 600,000 to 700,000-strong Bakongo community of northern
Angola, which comprises about 13% of the population.7 Ro-
berto's brother-in-law, Mobutu Sese Seko, is President of Zaire
and the recepient of substantial military and economic aid from the
United States. 8  The FNLA received direct material assistance
from the Chinese and financial assistance from the United
States. 9 Just as Portugal was trying to arrange the Alvor Accord,
the National Security Council's 40 Committee authorized a
War, 20 ORBis 669 (1976). See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC
STUDIES, STRATEGIC SURVEY 1975 27 (1976), and CIA's Secret War in Angola, 1
INTELLIGENCE REPORT 1 (Center for National Security Studies 1975).
4 STRATEGIC SURVEY and INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 3. Angola pro-
duces coffee, sugar, cotton, tobacco and other foodstuffs, and has large resources
of oil, diamonds and iron ore. The country is also strategically located on the
southwest coast of the African continent. Its major ports provide the primary
outlet into the Atlantic Ocean for Zambia and Zaire, and its railroads provide
the major outlet for their copper.
5 Marcum, supra note 3, at 412-13.
6 Id. at 410.
7 INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
8 Id. at 4.
9 Marcum, supra note 3, at 410, 413.
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covert American grant of $300,000 to the FNLA. ° As a move-
ment, the FNLA entered the 1975 power struggle from a position
of military but not political strength.
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) resulted from a 1964 split within the FNLA and is
directed by Jonas Savimbi, a former Roberto aide." Its base is
among the two million Ovimbundu of the central Benguela
plateau, who comprise 38% of the population of Angola.i2 Adopt-
ing a self-reliant strategy emulating the Chinese, UNITA forces
undertook to seize their weapons locally. 13  UNITA did not
receive significant outside help until early in 1976, when Savimbi
cultivated support from the United States, Britain, Zambia and
South Africa. 14
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
is led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, a Portuguese-educated physician.
The MPLA draws its primary support from the 1.3 million
Mbundu people of central and eastern Angola, who make up about
23% of the country's population.15 Based in the capital city of
Luanda, where it declared itself the legitimate government of the
country on Independence Day, the MPLA leadership is more urban,
intellectual, socialist, and racially mixed than that of the other
two movements.' 6  The MPLA received massive arms support
from the Soviet Union and large numbers of combat troops from
Cuba.17
The internal conflict among these groups thus became the
impetus for a superpower collision, as foreign intervention
changed the domestic civil war into a potentially explosive cold
war confrontation. In January 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger
recalled how the situation had appeared to the administration
in mid-1975.18  The military situation favored the MPLA and,
10 Id. at 414; STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 3, at 31.
11 Marcum, supra note 3, at 410-11; INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2;
STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 3, at 29.
12 Id.
13 Marcum, supra note 3, at 411.
14 INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
15 Marcum, supra note 3, at 411; INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
16 Id.; STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 3, at 28.
17 Marcum, id. at 413; INTELLIGENCE REPORT, id. at 2; STRATEGIC SURVEY, id.
at 31.
18 Testimony of Secretary of State Kissinger before the Subcommittee on African
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 122 CONG. REC. S 815-818
(daily ed. Jan. 29, 1976). See also Marcum, supra note 3, at 415.
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therefore, Zaire and Zambia turned to the United States for as-
sistance in preventing the Soviet Union and Cuba from (1) im-
posing a solution of their own in Angola, (2) becoming a dominant
influence in south-central Africa, and (3) threatening the stability
of the area.' 9 The United States responded covertly by supply-
ing $32.3 million in military hardware to the FNLA and to
UNITA by the end of 1975.2° As of late February 1976, there
were over 11,000 Cuban troops in Angola, and Soviet military
shipments over the previous 11 months totaled $300 million.21
In early February, ostensibly fearing another Vietnam-type involve-
ment, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly to halt
further covert U.S. aid to 'Angola's pro-Western forces.22 The
FNLA apparently used the remaining financial aid from the
United States to buy arms and to recruit soldiers in Europe.
In many parts of the world, self-styled "soldiers of fortune"
were making plans to participate in the struggle in Angola. 23
An English organization called "Security Advisory Services" was
offering recruits a $300 advance and a salary of $300 a week to
fight for UNITA and the FNLA. 24 The first batch of 25 left
London for Zaire on January 18; a month later 128 more recruits
departed. 25 The money to pay them reportedly came from bun-
dles of crisp, consecutively numbered American $100 bills. 26 On
February 6, eight Americans departed for Kinshasa. 27  After 4
days there, Holden Roberto himself led the Americans into
Angola, from which stories had been filtering back that MPLA
and Cuban forces had pushed the FNLA faction almost com-
pletely out of Angola. 28 By mid-February, 13 of the mercenaries
had been captured while on patrol. Subsequently Dr. Neto an-
nounced triumphantly that the MPLA had won the Angolan civil
war, following which the Soviet Union and 26 members of the
19 Marcum, id. at 416.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 417; STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra note 3, at 32. The total number of
troops may have been as high as 25,000 then, as it was in June, according to
Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA Representative in the United States. N.Y. Times,
Jun. 22, 1976, at 34, col. 3.
22 Marcum, id. at 419; STRATEGIC SURVEY, id. at 32.
23 Mercenaries: 'A Bloody Shambles', TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 21-22.
2A The Mercenary Life, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 30.
5 Id.
26 Id.
27 American Guns for Hire, radio interview by Charles Cobb for National




Organization of African Unity extended recognition to the MPLA
government. 29
About 3 months later, the judicial process began. On
May 26, 1976, one Irish, nine British and three American soldiers
were indicted by the People's Revolutionary Court of Angola.30
Simultaneously, the government of Angola headed by Dr. Neto
called for an International Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries
(ICEM) to observe the trial and to make recommendations for
international action to deal with the problem of mercenaries. 31
On June 5, Luis de Almeida, the Director of Information and
Security of Angola, announced that the mercenaries were guilty,
that the Angolan government had only to decide how much to
punish them, and that British and American imperialism were
really on trial, not the 13 mercenaries. 32 On June 7, the Angolan
Minister of Justice, Diogenes Boavida, opened an exhibit in the
Museum of Angola displaying war equipment, photographs of
casualties and destruction, photogrfphs of captured documents
and other evidence (including captured American $100 bills), as
well as filmed interviews with some of the mercenaries. 33 On
June 9, tens of thousands of Angolans marched through Luanda
carrying banners which demanded death for the mercenaries.
There were no dissidents and no pleas for clemency from the
government employees and MPLA militants, nor from the young
school children who carried placards urging that the mercenaries
be killed. 34
The trial began on Friday, June 11, continued through the
weekend, and was completed on the evening of the 16th. The
semicircular courtroom for the trial was a newly renovated hall
in the Chamber of Commerce Building. The trial was conducted
in Portuguese, and there was simultaneous translation into English,
French, Spanish and Russian. More than 100 foreign journalists
were present in the upper balcony, and the trial was recorded
officially on videotape. The Court was composed of five judges,
two of whom are required to be graduates in law, and all of whom
are appointed for 6 months. 3s  The Attorney General of An-
29 An Easy Rout - and an Olive Branch, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 18.
30 Indictment, see Appendix I infra.
31 N.Y. Times, Jun. 6, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
32 Id.; Christian Science Monitor, Jun. 8, 1976, at 3, Col. 3.
33 N.Y. Times, Jun. 9, 1976, at 7, col. 3.
m Id., Jun'. 10, 1976, at 9, col. 1.
Article 4, LAw No. 7/76 OF 1ST OF MAY [hereinafter cited as RULES OF
PROCEDURE], see Appendix III infra.
1977]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
gola, Ernesto Teixeira da Silva, was the Presiding Judge. 36
The other legally qualified judge was the Director of Angolan
Television.37 Two of the other judges were officers of FAPLA
(the military arm of the MPLA) and the fifth judge was a mem-
ber of the National Council of Women in Angola.38
Final prosecution arguments occurred on Thursday, June 17.
Procurator Manuel Rui Alves Monteiro's 3-hour summation
was greeted by applause from the court and the press gallery and
by shouts of "death." 39  He called on the Court to "punish
severely" the mercenaries as a warning against further mercenary
attacks in southern Africa.40 The next day, defense attorneys
made their final arguments. Chief American counsel Robert
Cesner, Jr., pleaded that the 13 mercenaries be treated as prison-
ers of war and argued that they could not be punished for an act
which did not violate any law. 4 1 The court-appointed Angolan
defense lawyers emphasized that the defendants were "tools of
imperialist aggression."42 The three British lawyers put the blame
on the American and British governments for permitting the re-
cruitment of mercenaries. 43  On Saturday, June 19, each of the
mercenaries made closing statements." Most denied committing
any crimes and sorrowfully asked for leniency.
On June 28, the verdicts were announced. 4s Two Americans
and seven British nationals were sentenced to prison terms ranging
from 16 to 30 years. Three British nationals and one American
were sentenced to die before a firing squad. There is no appeal
from the People's Revolutionary Court, 46 but death sentences
must be reviewed by President Neto. 47 Saying that the "practice
36 George H. Lockwood, REPORT ON TRIAL OF MERCENARIES 7 (1976).
Mr. Lockwood was a member of the International Commission of Enquiry on
Mercenaries which was convened by the government of Angola. His observa-
tions of aid comments upon the trial are set forth in his Report.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 N.Y. Times, Jun. 18, 1976, § 1, at 6, col. 4.
40 id.
41 Id., Jun. 19, at 7, col. 3.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id., Jun. 20, 1976, at 8, col. 1; Christian Science Monitor, Jun. 21, 1976,
at 3, col. 1.
45 N.Y. Times, Jun. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
"' Article 27, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 35.




of mercenarism must be finished on this planet", he confirmed
the death sentences on July 9.48 The following day Callan,
McKenzie, Barker and Gearhart were executed. 49
PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Procedural Angolan law was inherited from the Portuguese
civil law system used during colonial times. This system of civil
or statutory law is characterized by specific legislative enactments,
as well as executive administrative decrees and ordinances, trea-
ties and protocols, all of which have been codified. 5° In this
system, judges participate actively in the courtroom procedure,
which is an inquisitorial process. The presumption is implicitly
one of the accused's guilt, and the entire method is designed to
determine the truth. Control of the proceedings is not conceded
to the parties but rests instead with the presiding judge. The
trial thus becomes the culmination of a long and thorough in-
vestigation by the court, rather than a contest between opposing
counsels.
By way of contrast, common law is predominantly judge-made
law, and the significant characteristic is the doctrine of precedent,
by which the judges refer to previous decisions in order to adjudi-
cate the case at issue. Common law trials are basically an ad-
versary or accusatorial procedure, under which the accused is
presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Among the safeguards for the accused under this philosophy of
law are the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to cross-
examine witnesses and the writ of habeas corpus. An important
feature of the accusatorial procedure is that the judge is only an
impartial arbiter between the litigating parties. Only rarely does
the judge exercise discretion to intervene in the substantive ques-
tioning, and then only to avert grave injustice and not to advance
the case for either side.
On November 11, 1975, the MPLA formed a government and
adopted a constitution.si Subsequent legislation was enacted to
enable the various governmental branches to discharge their func-
tions. The prime example of this is Law No. 7/76 of May 1st,
1976 - "The Law Constituting the People's Revolutionary Court"
48 N.Y. Times, Jul. 10, 1976, at 6, col. 4.
49 Id., Jul. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
50 For a general discussion of the two systems, see ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 12-17, 98-102 (1975).
" STRATEGIC SURVEY, supra, note 3, at 34; Marcum, supra note 3, at 417.
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(hereinafter cited as the Rules of Procedure).2 As authority for
enacting this law, the Council of the Revolution cites Articles
32(e) and 38(a) of the Constitutional Law. These Articles deal,
respectively, with the rights of the President to promulgate the
laws of the Council of the Revolution, and of the Council to
discharge legislative functions. s3 The law also mentions Article
44, which concerns the discharge of juridical functions and the
organization, composition, and competence of the courts.54 Ar-
ticle 3 of the Rules of Procedure states that the Court is
competent to hear: (1) Crimes against the Angolan people, terri-
tory and government; (2) acts and activities which threaten the
fundamental rights stipulated in the Constitutional Law; and (3)
war crimes and crimes against humanity.55
Decree No. 3/75 of the 29th of November, 1975, authorizes
the Directorate of Information and Security of Angola to prepare
a "Case" for trial.5  This is similar to the French dossier pre-
pared by an examining magistrate (juge d'instruction) or to a grand
jury indictment at common law. In essence, the process entails
the discovery and presentation of all known facts concerning a
possible violation of the law. Once prepared, the Case may be
"filed away" and not acted upon either by the prosecutor or the
Court or be submitted for trial. Action upon the Case depends on
whether the Court or the Procurator (the equivalent of prosecutor)
finds that the Case shows sufficient evidence of (1) a punishable
offense, (2) the identity of the offenders, and (3) their responsi-
bility. 57
If the Case is accepted, the Procurator prepares and presents
an Indictment to the Court. Article 10(c) of the Rules of Proce-
dure specifies that the Indictment must indicate the laws and
rules infringed58  The President of the Court may dismiss the
Indictment, or accept it and issue a "Notice of Charges" and set
the trial date. As provided under Article 12, the Notice of Charges
incorporates the Indictment, identifies defense counsel for each
defendant, and notifies the defendants of their procedural rights.59
52 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 35.
53 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA [hereinafter
cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], see Appendix V infra.
54 Id.
5s Id.
56 Lockwood, supra note 36, at 9.
57 Id.




The case proceeds to trial if, after the Court examines the file,
it finds "that there is sufficient substantive evidence to show the
criminal responsibility of the defendant. ' 6" This procedure under
Article 11 is similar to a requirement under common law that an
accused stand trial if there is probable cause to believe the ac-
cused committed the crime.
Members of ICEM, representing two different juridical systems
- common law and civil law - identified seven universal principles
guaranteeing respect for defendants' rights. 61
a) Right to know the charges - Articles 10 and 12(a) of the Rules
of Procedure mandate that the defendant be notified of the
charges against him. The official Notice of Charges includes a
brief statement of the punishable acts, the laws and rules allegedly
violated and the corresponding penalties for those violations.
b) Right to examine the case file - Each defendant has the right,
through his defense counsel, to consult the Case against him dur-
ing a period of 8 days from the time each is notified of the charges.
c) Right to confront one's accusers - Article 23(2) of the Rules of
Procedure allows the defendant to cross-examine prosecution wit-
nesses.
d) Right to be heard - This right is guaranteed by Articles 20,
22(1) and (2), 24, and 25(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
e) Right to present witnesses - Each defendant may present his
or her own witnesses, and the Court must hear the testimony of
these witnesses, according to Articles 12(d) and 23(1) of the Rules
of Procedure.
f) Right to Counsel - The Court is obliged to appoint an offi-
cial defense counsel for each accused in the Notice of Charges.
In addition, each defendant may substitute defense counsel of his
own choice up to the day of the trial. These rights are guaranteed
in Articles 12(b) and 13. During the actual trial of the merce-
naries, in fact, the proceedings were postponed 3 days at the beginning
to allow American defense attorneys, Cesner and Wilson, to prepare
for the trial. Grillo chose to retain his Angolan counsel, while
Acker and Gearhart substituted the American lawyers for their
appointed defense. Again, when British barristers arrived on the
third day of the trial, substitution of counsel was allowed. Only
three British defendants substituted these for their Angolan law-
60Id.
61 Declaration on the Compliance of Angolan Procedural Law with the Uni-
versal Principles Guaranteeing Respect for the Right to Defence, ICEM,
[hereinafter cited as Declaration on Compliance], see Appendix VI infra.
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yers. Presiding Judge Ernesto Teixeira da Silva announced that
the Court agreed to permit the British lawyers to enter the trial
late as "an act of generosity," and to give "every facility" to the
defense .62
g) Right to public trial - Article 15(1) of the Rules of Procedure
prescribes that the trial must be public.
In addition to these rights, Article 21 of the Rules of Procedure
permits the defendants to remain silent at the trial. Not all wit-
nesses need testify, and their testimony need not be believed. In
fact, only ten of the 21 listed witnesses were called and one of those
was dismissed for perjuring himself. The accused need only reply
to the charges in a written statement of defense.63
The actual course of the trial was somewhat less structured
than these formal guarantees of procedural due process. Events
appeared to further the purpose of the inquisitorial system of jus-
tice, designed to "reveal the truth" as required by Articles 19 and
23 of the Rules of Procedure. 64  During the trial, defendants
were not sworn, although witnesses were. The underlying as-
sumption here seems to be that the extensive pre-trial investiga-
tion of the case obviates the need for all testimony at trial to be
sworn. Defendants were questioned first by the Judges, then by
the Procurator, and then by defense counsel. Hearsay evidence
from witnesses was not excluded. Many of the flamboyant Proc-
urator's statements were political, or hearsay, or leading questions
which are prohibited by Article 22 of the Rules of Procedure. 65
This was not considered detrimental by the defense attorneys, who
quickly learned to use leading questions also, eliciting simple re-
sponses from the witnesses and defendants. The attorneys used
the same methods as the prosecution to explain the motives of
their defendants and to illustrate the paucity of combat each had
seen in Angola. Although many mercenaries testified against
each other, the accused defendants were not present while their
accusers were testifying. Once again, this seems peculiar to the
inquisitorial system, rather than the adversary system. The onus
is on the Court, on the one hand, to determine "the truth," and
on the other hand, to preserve the procedural rights of the defen-
dants. The ICEM, having attended and observed all sessions of
the trial of the mercenaries before the People's Revolutionary
62 N.Y. Times, Jun. 14, 1976, at 9, col. 1.





Court, was satisfied that the trial was fair and was conducted
with dignity and solemnity. It was further convinced that all
rules of procedure were interpreted in favor of the defendants.66
THE INDICTMENT
On May 26, 1976, Procurator Monteiro submitted to the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Court a 33-page Indictment, which had been
prepared by the Directorate of Information and Security of Angola,
in accordance with Decree No. 3/75 of November 20, 1975. This
was duly accepted by the Court, which issued a Notice of
Charges and scheduled the trial for June 8, 1976.
First, the Indictment (for text see Appendix I) charged all 13
defendants generally with the crime of being mercenaries, 67 in
violation of two Organization of African Unity Resolutions -
AHG/Res. 49 (IV), of September 11-14, 1967, in Kinshasa, Congo,
and CM/St. 6 (XVII) of June 21-23, 1971, in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia; and four United Nations Resolutions - 2395 (XXIII),68
2465 (XXIII),69 2548 (XXIV)70 and 3103 (XXVII).71
Second, all the defendants were charged with crimes against
peace, in violation of the Statute of the Nurnberg International
Military Tribunal,72 confirmed by United Nations Resolution
95(1) of December 11, 1946.73 Without specifying where, the In-
dictment states that these crimes are also cited in current Angolan
law.
Third, all the defendants are accused of "murders, maltreat-
ment, insults and harassment of members of the civilian popula-
tion; murder of MPLA members; of other mercenaries and of
other FNLA soldiers; kidnapping of civilians and stealing of their
property . . ."'74 No provisions of the Revolutiunary Penal Code
are cited as being violated.
661Declaration on Compliance, supra note 60.
67 Indictment, supra note 30, at Introduction and para. 134.
68 G.A. REs. 2395, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968).
69 G.A. REs. 2465, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968).
70 G.A. REs. 2548, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969).
71 G.A. RES. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
72 Indictment, supra note 30, at Introduction and para. 136.
73 G.A. REs. 95(l), 1 GAOR, Pt. 11 (1946).
74 Indictment, supra note 30, at para. 138.
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Last, the Indictment charged each defendant separately, again
without mentioning specific Code violations. The alleged crimes
of Costas Georgiou, alias "Tony Callan," included the murders
of civilians, FAPLA soldiers, and other mercenaries. The de-
fendant McKenzie was charged with stealing and destruction of
military and civilian equipment and property, with maltreatment
and kidnapping of civilians and with assisting Callan in murdering
13 British mercenaries on February 1, 1976, who wanted to return
home to England against his wishes. The defendants McIntyre,
Marchant, Evans and Wiseman were charged with being mem-
bers of Callan's contingent, known as "Killer Group," and with
killing FAPLA soldiers in combat on the first and third of Feb-
ruary. The other Britons - Lawlor, Fortuin, Barker and Nam-
mock - and the three Americans - Grillo, Gearhart and Acker
- were accused generally of participating in armed actions against
FAPLA forces. Gearhart alone was specifically charged with
soliciting his role as a mercenary by placing an advertisement in
Soldier of Fortune magazine .1
The Court also took note of "the stable and organized groups"
whose members "were all conscious" that the group "had been
constituted to commit crimes within the borders of the People's
Republic of Angola."76 Although the Indictment did not specifi-
cally accuse the defendants of criminal conspiracy, the Verdict
(for text see Appendix II) found that the defendants had formed
a conspiracy in violation of Article 263 of the Revolutionary Penal
Code. As noted previously, Article 10 (c) of the Procedural Code
specifies that the Indictment must indicate the laws and rules
infringed. The Indictment does not mention Article 263, nor
does it appear in the public consolidation of the Revolutionary
Penal Code made available to the defense attorneys and to the
ICEM.
As proof of the charges the Indictment lists: a) Confessions
of the defendants, b) 21 witnesses, and c) reports from psychia-
tric, clinical and forensic doctors77 In addition, at the end of the
oral evidence at trial, the Procurator presented a film showing an
"' SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Spring, 1976, at 75, col. 2. The advertisement reads:
"WANTED: EMPLOYMENT AS MERCENARY on Full-Time or Job
Contract basis. Preferably in South or Central America, but anywhere in the
world, if you pay transportation. Contact Gearhart, Box 1457, Wheaton, MD
20902." These 33 words, at $.20 per word, may ultimately have cost Gearhart
his life.
76 Indictment, supra note 30, at Conclusion para. 1.
77 Id. at para. 140.
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interview with U.S. President Ford, interspersed with scenes of
military troops and equipment in Angola, mass graves, and local
destruction. This is reminiscent of the captured Nazi films shown
by the Prosecution in some of the Niirnberg war crimes trials.
The Indictment demands that the defendants be punished for
these crimes under the MPLA Combatants Disciplinary Law of
July 10, 1966 (for text see Appendix IV). The death penalty is
also sought, under the authority of Presidential Service Order of
September 12, 1970, signed by Dr. Neto (for text see Appendix
IV). It is claimed that these are incorporated in Angolan law by
virtue of Article 58 of the Angolan Constitutional Law, which
states that laws and regulations in force on Independence Day
(November 11, 1975) shall be valid unless repealed or amended
and so long as they do not conflict with the spirit of the current
law.78
The Combatants Disciplinary Law was designed for and used
by the MPLA forces during the long civil war. It lists offenses,
rewards, penalties and decorations for MPLA soldiers. There
are nine categories of offenses, ranging from "offenses against
the dignity of the struggle" to "offence with regard to laws, au-
thorities, and people."79
Among the categories of penalities are severe imprisonment
and the death penalty. Severe imprisonment is available for
"Everyone and deserters or disarmed enemies." The death pen-
alty is reserved exclusively for "Everyone and enemies."' 8  The
Court imposed the death sentence on four of the mercenaries be-
cause, among other reasons, "mercenaries are uncontestably ene-
mies. "81
SUBSTANTIVE ANAL YSIS
The procedural fairness accorded to the defendants has been
examined already. The substantive fairness of the proceedings
will now be considered. There are several key questions: Was a
crime committed by the defendants? If so, what law was vio-
lated? Was the source of the law a domestic civil code, or a rec-
ognized principle of international law, or a treaty or convention
ratified by a number of States? If the activity is considered uni-
78 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 53.
" COMBATANTS DISCIPLINARY LAW OF 10TH OF JULY 1966, see Appendix IV
infra.
B id.
81 Verdict, see Appendix II infra, at para. 65.
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versally abhorrent to the conscience of world nations, is it im-
material whether such an offense has been codified in penal law
or reduced to treaty form?82 What follows here is a discussion
of these aspects of the judicial process at the Angola trial. Ulti-
mately it is a search for precedent, if not in the common-law sense
of prior judicial decisions, then at least in the literal sense of a
similar event.
Intertwined in this discussion is the unique problem of the
status of the mercenaries. First of all, were the defendants mer-
cenaries, and if so by what definition? Assuming that they were,
and further assuming arguendo that they committed some crime or
crimes, should their status as mercenaries exempt them from prose-
cution, or alter their treatment? In terms of its legacy to the laws
of war, this trial may be remembered less for what was done
than for how it was done. This trial is a continuation of the pro-
cess of developing the laws of war, on the one hand. On the
other hand, viewed more provincially, it is only a domestic trial of
locally-situated criminals.
As indicated previously, there were four categories of offenses
and several sources of law mentioned in the Indictment:8 3
ALLEGED OFFENSE ALLEGED SOURCE
1. Being a mercenary -2 OAU Resolutions
-4 U.N. Resolutions
2. Crimes against peace -Ntirnberg Charter
3. Murder, robbery, de- -Angolan Revolutionary
struction of property Penal Code
4. Conspiracy -Angolan Revolutionary
Penal Code
The next section deals separately with domestic Angolan law,
the Ntirnberg Charter and international law as sources.
ANGOLAN LAW
The Angola trial was not the first public trial of a white mer-
cenary in Africa. That historic distinction belongs to the trial
of Rolf Steiner by the government of the Sudan in August 1971. 84
s2 According to one commentator, one cannot be punished unjustly under
the terms of international law if the principle or law is recognized by most states
and is not subject to quick mutation. See J. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 48 (1954).
83 Indictment, supra note 30.
84 See In the Trial of F. E. Steiner - A Court Martial, SUDAN LAW JOURNAL
AND REPORTS 147 et seq. (1971).
[Vol. 9: 323
MERCENARY TRIALS
In putting the German-born soldier on trial for waging war against
the Sudan, the government staged what it termed "the Nurem-
berg trial of Africa. '" 5  There were other parallels with the
Angola trial as well. The six-man military tribunal heard prose-
cutor Sayed Khalafalla el Rashid condemn the mercenaries' ruth-
less activity as an international crime plaguing the Third World.86
Steiner denied he was a mercenary, depicting himself as an ideal-
ist who had sought to help the southern Sudan's oppressed blacks
free themselves from the domination of the Arab north.87 In his
"confession" he admitted his role in the Anyanya rebellion and
implicated a host of governments and agencies.88
In a lengthy summation to the Khartoum People's Court,
Judge-Advocate Dafalla el Radi Siddig reviewed the Court's ju-
risdiction, the accused's presence within the Court's power, and
the criminal laws allegedly violated by Steiner.89  Unlike the
People's Revolutionary Court in Luanda, however, this court
charged Steiner only with violations of domestic law. Specifi-
cally, the court cited Section 98 of the Sudan Penal Code, which
"seeks to punish whoever collects arms, men or ammunition or
otherwise prepares to wage war against the Sudan Govern-
ment." 90 Other alleged crimes included violations of Section 7
of Republican Order IV, 91 Section 21 of Republican Order IV,92
and Section 203 of the Customs Ordinance. 93 Recognizing that
Steiner's acts by their nature constituted a political crime, the
court sought to define the violation more precisely. The court
then rejected international law as a potential source because there
15 SUDAN: Africa's 'Nuremberg Trial', NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1971, at 31.
86 Id.
87 Id. Steiner's first military experience had been with a branch of the Hitler
Youth movement known as the Nazi "Wolf Cubs." Later he saw action with
the French Foreign Legion and in Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, Algeria
and Biafra, where he considered himself an armed missionary bringing salvation
to the natives. The Armed Missionary, TIME, Nov. 22, 1971, at 53.
s8 TIME, supra note 87. Among those mentioned were the Central In-
telligence Agency, Peace Corps, British Intelligence, the Roman Catholic
Church, Israel, Ethiopia and Uganda. Id.
89 SUDAN LAW JOURNAL AND REPORTS, supra note 84.
90 Id. at 155.
91 Id. at 154-155. Republican Order IV concerns acts which are likely to
prejudice the unity or peace of the Sudan,' and Section 7 deals with efforts to
obtain assistance from other States in working to overthrow the Sudan.
92 Id. at 157. Section 21 prohibits "injurious falsehood" directed against
the government of the Sudan.
93 Id. Defense counsel argued that the drugs were used for treating lepers
and others.
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was no "unequivocal and uniform yard-stick [sic] as to what is
and what is not a political offense to make it a rule of interna-
tional law. "94 Finally, the Judge-Advocate exhorted the court
that:
the sections of the law under which the accused is being tried
all start with the word whosoever which could mean a mer-
cenary or any body [sic] else. Your concern would be to look
into the deeds of the accused and the interests of the society
safeguarded by law which these deeds threaten. It is the gravity
or no gravity of such acts which should motivate you to mitigate
punishment or otherwise.
Ultimately the Court found Rolf Steiner guilty and sentenced
him to death, but President Jaafar Numeiry immediately com-
muted the sentence to 20 years imprisonment.9
No provision of the Angolan Constitution, or of the Rules of
Procedure, or of the 1966 MPLA Combatants Code specifically
prohibits crimes against peace or the crime of being a mercenary.
The Revolutionary Penal Code presumably forbids murder, rob-
bery, assault and the like, as well as conspiracy, but it must re-
main only a presumption since specific Code sections are not
cited and Section 263, which is cited, is not publically available.
The Combatants Code, on its face, applies to the pre-independence
MPLA armed forces and not to the general population. One
can argue that all laws existing in Angola on Independence Day
were assumed by the new MPLA government. This would ac-
cord with accepted custom and practice among States in the inter-
national community. In fact, Article 58 of the Constitutional
Law does incorporate "laws and regulations at present in force
"97 Even if the Code is currently valid, however, the language
still refers only to Angolan combatants and not to citizens or even
to mercenaries. Finally the Code does not mention in any way
the crimes alleged in the Indictment. It is a recognized principle
of international law that presence within the territory of a State
gives the State jurisdiction to legislate and to enforce its own
laws upon those within its borders. This was not the reasoning
of the Court here, at least not explicitly.
As for the Constitutional Law, Article 17 speaks to certain
fundamental rights and duties of citizens of the People's Re-
94 Id. at 152.
95 Id. at 172.
% TIME, supra note 87.
97 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 53.
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public of Angola. 98  Article 17 disallows the installation of
foreign military bases within the territory;99 presumably this
applies to Cuban forces as well as to UNITA and the FNLA.
Article 23 ensures that citizens shall be brought to trial only under
the terms of the law.1° Taken as a whole, the Constitutional Law
appears to apply only to the citizens of the State, although a foreign
State could protest if its nationals were not being accorded the
same treatment as citizens of the first State. According to the
Constitutional Law itself, legislative functions are to be discharged
by the Council of the Revolution in the spirit of that document.1
The Council could and perhaps should have enacted specific
legislation dealing with crimes against peace and crimes of mer-
cenarism, in order to punish that activity.
The Rules of Procedure purport to create a Court competent
to hear certain crimes and to establish procedural norms which
will govern its function.102 None of the Articles purports to
legislate criminal or civil statutes. Article 3 only establishes the
Court's competence to judge certain crimes, noted earlier.103
Some other law must establish the behavior as criminal, since
this is only a procedural statute. Assuming arguendo that Law
No. 7/76 of the 1st of May did proscribe mercenarism and crimes
against peace, this law was enacted 10 or more weeks after the
defendants were captured. At the time of their arrests, the de-
fendants had not violated existing Angolan law except arguably
laws forbidding* illegal entry, kidnapping, murder, and robbery.
Callan and McKenzie were the only two charged with murder.
None of the others was even charged with these crimes. They
were indicted for certain characteristic military behavior, such
as ambushes, destruction of property, killing soldiers in combat
and participating in armed actions against FAPLA forces.104
The defendants were not innocent bystanders in the conflagration.
From a purely legal viewpoint, though, they were not specifically
charged with committing some crimes and they violated no specific
laws concerning other crimes. What the People's Revolutionary




101 Id. at art. 38(a).
102 RuLEs OF PROCEDURE, supra note 35.
103 Id.
104 Indictment, supra note 30, at para. 15.
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of conjecture. The consequence of the failure to provide domestic
legislation to proscribe activity later deemed to be criminal is a
denial of substantive due process. The Court becomes the ultimate
arbiter of what constitutes a crime, not the legislative body.
Potential transgressors have no advance notice of what acts are
punishable and courts are at liberty to dispense ad hoc justice
arbitrarily. The ex post facto nature of Law No. 7/76 renders it
invalid as a statutory prohibition of any acts committed by the
defendants.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
As examples of international law, the People's Revolutionary
Court cited the Charter of the NUrnberg Military Tribunal 105
and Resolutions of the United Nations' °6 and of the Organization
of African Unity. 0 7 The Charter was used as support for the
charge of crimes against peace leveled against all the mercenaries,
while the Resolutions were used to document the crime of mer-
cenarism. For obvious support value, it is apparent why the
Court used these documents. What remains unclear is why this
domestic court bothered at all with international declarations of
questionable relevance to its own proceedings. The following
sections will attempt to find the answer, which in turn will de-
pend on the relevance of another issue - the status of mercenaries
under international law. The discussion is not meant to be
exhaustive on this latter topic, but claims only to be an overview
of a vague and complicated province of international law.
STATUS OF MERCENARIES
Any discussion of mercenarism, particularly in the context
of its being a crime, is confused by the difficulty of defining
precisely what a mercenary is. To some the term conjures up
the romantic image of a "soldier of fortune" while to others the
term causes revulsion. Is a mercenary a tribesman fighting with
another tribe, or an idealistic youth who joined the International
Brigade in Spain; or is he a member of the Pope's Swiss Guard
at the Vatican? Is mercenarism restricted only to military ac-
tivity, as opposed to that of a political, religious or philosophical
nature? In his history of mercenaries, Anthony Mockler con-
105 Id. at para. 136.




cludes that it is not enough to base the definition either on status
or motive, or even on a combination of the two. The real
mark of the mercenary, he says, is "a devotion to war for its
own sake. '"108  This definition, elegant in its simplicity, seems
to apply to the legendary Colonel Mike Hoare's "Wild Geese"
and his Five Commando, which fought in the Congo rebellion
during the 1960's. It is rumored that they killed Patrice Lumumba,
and that they can assemble a small professional army of 200-
300 men within 72 hours even today. 109 Does that definition
apply also to Daniel Gearhart, who never fired a single shot dur-
ing 4 days in Angola but who hired himself out as a mercenary?
Although the court in the Steiner case did not bother with such
a trifling matter as the definition of a mercenary because the
law was all-inclusive, the Angolan court labored over the problem
in its verdict. One section states that mercenarism "was not
unknown in traditional penal law, where it was always dealt with
in relation to homicide."110 This reference is to paid assassination,
of course, to the hired killer.
Later the verdict states that in modern penal law, as well as
in comparative law, "the mercenary crimes lost all autonomous
existence and was seen as a common crime, . .. aggravated by
the profit motive . . . ."i The verdict begins by considering
mercenarism an international crime, over which courts of every
State would have jurisdiction according to the principle of uni-
versality. The section ends by saying mercenarism has again
become a common crime, one that is specifically "provided for
in Article 20 No. 4 of the Penal Code in force."112 Unfortunately
for the defendants, this law was not cited in the Indictment, nor
was it made available to the defense attorneys or to the ICEM.
Undaunted the Court declared, "This annuls the objection of the
defense that the crime of mercenarism has not been defined and
that there is no penalty for it."113 The Court seems to con-
sider that mercenarism is an agglomeration of specific common
crimes like murder, rape, larceny or wanton destruction, rather
than a unique crime separately punishable. If that is the proper
understanding then only Callan and McKenzie were properly
108 See A. MOCKLER, THE MERCENARIES 13-24 (1970).
109 NEWSWEEK, supra note 24, at 31.
110 Verdict, supra note 81, at para. 46.
Il Id. at para. 53.
112 Id. at para. 54.
113 Id. at para. 55.
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convicted, because such common crimes were alleged only against
these two. The others also were charged with mercenarism but
committed none of those crimes and thus were not justly convicted.
The ICEM also evolved a definition of mercenarism. The
Commissioners declared that "new forms . . . are continually
being created in response to new needs to repress workers' strug-
gles or movements for national independence throughout the
world." 114 In its Luanda Convention on the prevention of mer-
cenarism, 115 the ICEM attempted to codify international rules
in a single text. Article One lists the ICEM proposals for
elements of the crime of mercenarism:
a) any individual, group or state
b) in armed opposition to self-determination
c) which
1. organizes, finances, trains, employs, supports a military
force of non-nationals to act for personal gain, or
2. enlists in such a force, or
3. allows such activity in its territory." 6
The Draft Convention denies mercenaries the protection of pri-
soner of war status and exhorts contracting parties to enact
domestic legislation to implement these provisions.
These various "definitions" are no more than attempts to apply
static labels to a dynamic area of the laws of war. Two basic
issues suggest themselves in this regard. First, what distinguishes
the types of conflict in which mercenaries are engaged? Second,
what rights and responsibilities are placed upon mercenaries in
each type of conflict?
As will be seen, the rights and obligations of mercenaries
do not depend upon whether the conflict in which they participate
is declared or undeclared. The 1949 Geneva Conventions apply
not only to declared war but also to "any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."117
114 Declaration of Luanda, 10th June 1976, ICEM, see Appendix VII infra.
115 Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism,
ICEM, see Appendix VIII infra.
116 Id. at art. One,
117 Article 2, from which this statement is drawn, is common to all four
Conventions. See Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the Amerlioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Conven-
tion Releative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6
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Noted commentator Richard Falk has pointed out that "warfare
between states now most frequently takes place within a single
national society . . .Significant multinational participation
transforms an internal war into a species of international law."118
This assertion is the' basis of his argument that the traditional
criteria for distinguishing international from national conflicts are
inadequate for modern needs. He further contends that now it is
essential that substantial participation in the internal war by
private or public groups external to the society experiencing
violence serve as a basis for internationalizing civil strife' 19
Universal acceptance of this idea would undoubtedly help to bring
international law into closer touch with the realities of world
politics.
Already there is a steady pressure both within and without the
United Nations General Assembly for an extension of combatant
status to include new forms and classes and to exclude others.
In the context of guerrilla warfare, Draper indicates there is
pressure to remove the distinction as to lawful status as com-
batants for those engaged in international and non-international
conflicts. 2°  This is one of the main areas of confrontation, he
believes, in which the future shape of a crucial part of the law
of war will have to be resolved by governments. Draper sees
two trends in the legitimation process:
First, the accepted view that common criminals who resort to
armed force to achieve their ends, are to be excluded from any
attribution of lawful combatancy. Second, we are seeing a
widening of the idea of a political struggle carried out by armed
force being within the control of the existing law of war. This
has the corollary that those who participate in such a struggle,
whether openly or clandestinely and sporadically, should be
treated as lawful combatants entitled to the full status of prison-
ers of war upon capture.121
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365.
"1 Falk, The International Law of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
CIVIL STRIFE 218 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
119 Id. at 223.
120 Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 45
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 173, 184 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Draper]. For a discus-
sion of the rules of warfare as they relate to guerrilla warfare and revolutionary
war, especially those rules dealing with the status and treatment of captured
combatants, see King, Revolutionary War, Guerrilla Warfare, and International Law,
4 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 91 et seq. (1972).
121 Id.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross reached a
similar conclusion. Its report noted that when there is foreign
military intervention on the insurgents' side, "there would seem
no doubt that the laws and customs [of war] should be applied as
a whole to the conflict, which thus becomes of an international
nature.' ' 122  It is unclear whether "intervention" includes troops,
arms or supplies and how substantial such assistance would have
to be.
For the purpose of determining the general status of merce-
naries under the customary international laws of war, one can
refer to Article 1 of the Hague Resolutions of 1907123 and to
Article 4A(1) and (2) of the 1949 Geneva Prisoners of War
Convention. 124 The latter incorporates and extends the classifica-
tion of prisoner of war while preserving the four basic conditions
of the Hague Resolutions. This status is far from clear, but to
qualify as a lawful combatant, a mercenary would have to meet
the following conditions:25
(1) He must be a member of an "organized" group -
armed forces, militia, volunteer corps, organized resistance
movement.
(2) He must belong to "a Party to the conflict" - even
if there is an organized group with its own commander, the
members will not have combatant status if it lacks the neces-
sary connection with a Party to the conflict.
(3) He must be "commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates" - the commander must have an ac-
knowledged position of authority such that the conditions re-
quired for lawful combatancy may be secured in practice.
(4) He must have a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance" - the test normally accepted is that the individ-
ual must be permanently marked so that he is distinguish-
122 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: REAFFIR-
MATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFLICTS, 21ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS 100 (1969).
123 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907; [1910] 36 STAT. 2277, 2295; see also FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF
WAR 308, 313 (1972), and SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
57 et seq. (1973).
124 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 117.
12 Id. See also Mallison and Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Com-
batants Under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. (1977).
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able from an ordinary peaceful civilian at a distance at which
weapons can be used by or on them.
(5) He must carry arms "openly" - this is similar to (4)
in scope and difficulty of enforcement.
(6) He must conduct operations "in accordance with the
laws and customs of war" - this means unacceptable behavior,
such as murdering or torturing prisoners.
With the possible exception of (6) above, these conditions ap-
ply to the Angolan defendants. Solicited, greeted and escorted
by Holden Roberto, they entered Angola armed and in uni-
form.126 It was clear that Callan was the field commander, and
at the trial he accepted responsibility for their actions. By and
large, they observed the laws and customs of war, although the
execution of 13 homesick Britons by Callan and McKenzie might
arguably violate that condition. In any event, Article 5 of the
Prisoners of War Convention provides: "Should any doubt arise
as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and hav-
ing fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the cate-
gories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the pro-
tection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal." '27 Furthermore,
if an incumbent government shows little mercy in its conduct to-
ward captured rebels, it can most assuredly anticipate like treat-
ment in the event the rebels are ultimately victorious. Since the
outcome of internal revolutionary wars is seldom certain, it is to
every party's advantage to act in accord with these general hu-
manitarian principles.
NURNBERG CHARTER
It has long been established in customary international law
that a belligerent has authority to try and to punish individuals
for crimes which constitute violations of the laws and customs of
war, as well as the laws of humanity, when such persons fall with-
in its power.1 28 The mercenaries having been brought within its
jurisdiction, the People's Revolutionary Court sought out interna-
tional laws by which to try and to punish these defendants. As the
source of its charge of crimes against peace, the Court noted the
12 Indictment, supra note 30.
127 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 117.
128 Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 21
(1947). See also Biddle, The Nuremberg Trial, 33 VA. L. REv. 679 et seq. (1947).
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Charter of the Nurnberg Military Tribunal.29 As the source of
the charge of mercenarism, the Court selected certain U.N. and
OAU Resolutions. 13°  This section concerns the use of the
Nurnberg Charter as authority in the trial of the mercenaries.
On August 8, 1945, representatives of the United States,
France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed an agreement
to establish an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war
criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical loca-
tion.13' Annexed to and forming an integral part of this Agree-
ment was the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
which constituted the Court and its jurisdiction, detailed the na-
ture of particular crimes, and set out procedural rules to ensure
fair trials for the defendants.132 Indictment Number One con-
sisted of the following four Counts:
Count One: The common plan or conspiracy;
Count Two: Crimes against peace;
Count Three: War crimes;
Count Four: Crimes against humanity133
Article 6 of the Charter distinguishes between two categories of
crimes against peace which are reflected in the Indictment as
Courts One and Two. Crimes against peace are defined as
"planning, preparation, initiating or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or as-
surances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing. . .. "134 The Charter
does not define the term "aggressive war." The determination of
the Court as to the existence of aggressive war was founded on an
elaborate historical review of the events before and during the war
129 Indictment, supra note 30, at para. 136.
130 Indictment, supra note 30, at para. 134;
131 Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 1 NAzi CONSPIRACY AND AG-
GRESSION 1 (1946).
132 Id. at 4-11.
133 Id. at 13-56.
134 Id. at 5. Although not cited by the Angolan Court, Article 6 also defines
two other categories of crimes. War Crimes are violations of the laws or cus-
toms of war, such as murder, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities or devastation not justified by military necessity. Crimes
against Humanity are defined as murder, extermination, enslavement, or perse-
cution on political, racial or religious grounds.
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period and was a result of its evaluation of these facts. 13s It is
clear that not every attack or invasion by armed forces was con-
sidered as a war of aggression. 136 The count of conspiracy was
interpreted strictly by the Court as the significant contribution,
with knowledge of its purpose, to the elaboration of a concrete
plan to wage war. 137 The distinctive feature of the second Count
was that the crimes against peace be connected with particular
wars of aggression, as opposed to a general policy of aggressive
wars as in Count One. Here the Court adoptedthe principle that
only acts of warfare constituting a waging of criminal war are
crimes against peace.138  These acts were considered criminal
only inasmuch as they were undertaken by military and adminis-
trative officials in highly influential positions. 139 The Court did
not adopt the extreme theory that every act of warfare committed
in the prosecution of a criminal war is an international crime. 140
By comparison with the NUrnberg Tribunal, the People's Rev-
olutionary Court of Angola cast a paltry shadow. Whereas the
Tribunal was an international court established by international
agreement, the People's Revolutionary Court was a domestic
tribunal established by domestic law. The Nulrnberg Charter
constituted a court (whose members all were legally qualified)
which defined the procedural rules and established the specific
substantive law to be applied. The Rules of Procedure, by con-
trast, set up a Court requiring that only two members be legally
qualified and they established the jurisdiction of the Court over
certain generalized crimes not covered by domestic statutory law.
The Nllrnberg Tribunal indicted the military and administrative
leaders of the Third Reich, while the Angola court charged only
ordinary combat soldiers, the titular leader of whom (Callan) was
not a field commander in the sense of the Charter. These mer-
cenaries arguably could have been convicted of war crimes for
135 The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg Tribunal: History and
Analysis, Memorandum submitted by United Nations Secretary-General 47-48
(1949).
136 Id. at 49.
137 Id. at 53.
138 Id. at 61.
139 Id. at 58-60. Thus Admiral Doenitz was expressly convicted of waging
war, for his role as Commander in Chief of the Navy and previously as leader of
the submarine force. The civilian Seyss-Inquart was found guilty also, for gov-
erning territory which was of vital importance in the aggressive war being waged
by Germany. But Albert Speer's role as director of the armament industry
was not considered to be waging war.
140 Id.
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violations of the laws and customs of war not justified by military
necessity. Not even Holden Roberto or Jonas Savimbi, the de-
clared leaders of the FNLA and UNITA, respectively, were in-
dicted, if only in absentia. On the other hand, the leaders of the
American and British governments, as well as their intelligence
agencies, were implicated by innuendo.
These oversights notwithstanding, the People's Revolutionary
Court should be judged perhaps in the light of the opening state-
ment by Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Chief U.S. Prosecutor at
the Niirnberg trial:
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization...
[It] asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to
deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order
of importance. It does not expect that you can make war im-
possible. It does expect that your juridical action will put the
forces of International Law, its precepts, its prohibitions and,
most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and
women of good will, in all countries, may have "leave to live
by no man's leave, underneath the law." 141
The spirit of this eloquent statement calls for the punishment of in-
dividuals who had brought civilization nearly to the brink of disaster,
while it permits those same individuals the privilege of defending
themselves and asserting their innocence. Jackson's view of the
trial expresses both the culmination of modern ideals of culture,
tolerance and justice, as well as the need to vindicate the rights of
those oppressed and persecuted. His challenge to the Tribunal
was that the spirit and the letter of the law be applied so that
justice might not be denied either to the victors or to the van-
quished. Viewed in this light, the Angola mercenaries trial be-
comes an attempt to prevent the spread of mercenarism through-
out Black Africa, to rid the continent of an unwelcome plague,
and by this judicial act to throw off the shackles of colonialism.
The People's Revolutionary Court would have been well ad-
vised to heed the comments of another participant in the war
crimes trials. Judge Radhabinod Pal of India was a member of
the Inter-National Military Tribunal for the Far East, commonly
known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. In his dissenting opin-
ion to the Judgment, he indicted the Western policies of exploita-
tion as the basis of World War II and thereby anticipated the
anti-colonial mood which flourished in the post-war period.
The so-called trial held according to the definition of crime
now given by the victors obliterates the centuries of civilization
i4i NAZI CoNsPIRAcY AND AGGRESSION, supra note 129, at 173.
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which stretch between us and the summary slaying of the de-
feated in a war. A trial with law thus prescribed will only be
a sham employment of legal process for the satisfaction of a
thirst for revenge. It does not correspond to any sense of jus-
tice. Such a trial may justly create the feeling that the setting
up of a tribunal like the present is much more a political than a
legal affair, an essentially political objective having thus been
cloaked by a judicial appearance. Formalized vengeance can
bring only an ephemeral satisfaction, with every probability
of ultimate regret; but vindication of law through genuine legal
process alone may contribute substantially to the "re-establish-
ment of order and decency in international relations . . ."
• . . In my judgment, therefore, it is beyond the competence
of any victor nation to go beyond the rules of international law
as they exist, give new definitions of crimes and then punish
the prisoners for having committed offenses according to this
new definition. 142
Viewed in the light of Judge Pal's remarks, the Revolutionary
People's Court exceeded the scope of its charter and succeeded
only in conducting a political harangue. The results may not have
been any different had the trial been more closely tailored to spe-
cific definitions of particular acts deemed offensive by the Court.
As only the second trial of white mercenaries by an African na-
tion, the trial certainly had significant political overtones, en-
hanced e'ven more by the inflammatory rhetoric accompanying it.
Having endured the participation by white mercenaries in their
struggles for independence, Black African countries were ripe to
make an example of them. Then too, the MPLA sought further
means of legitimizing itself as the official government of the new-
ly created People's Republic of Angola. A public war crimes
trial could be the vehicle by which the MPLA proclaimed its
supremacy to the world and to the Angolan people themselves.
The political circumstances of the trial thus were inescapable. 143
The fact-remains, however, that the purpose of a trial is to render
justice. Any other purpose - such as providing political fodder
or recording events for posterity - detracts from the main busi-
nesses of the law: To weigh the charges fairly, to render judg-
ment and then to carry out just punishment where necessary.
142 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pal, reported in FALK, KOLKO AND LIFTON,
CRIMES OF War 124-125 (1971).
143 Soldiers of Misfortune, NEWSWEEK, Jun. 21, 1976, at 42. Justice minister
Diogenes Boavida declared that "it is not these criminals who will be on trial,
but imperialism." Angolan Information Minister Luis de Almeida pronounced:
"There is no doubt in the Angolan Government's mind that they are guilty."
144 WYZANSKI, WHEREAS - A JUDGE'S PREMISES 175 (1965).
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Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., has stated 'the same thought in
fewer words: ". . . [T]o regard a trial as a propaganda device is
to debase justice."144
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
As its final source of law condemning the crime of merce-
narism, the People's Revolutionary Court cited several Resolutions
of the United Nations and of the OAU. The new People's Re-
public of Angola has been recognized by the OAU, 14s but it is
not a member of the U.N. Moreover, these resolutions do not
have the binding force of law, even on member nations, unless
the members specifically agree to be so bound. The resolutions
merely call on member States to enact legislation into their own
penal codes which prohibits the crime of mercenarism. Since the
Council of the Revolution passed no such statute which manifested
an intent, express or otherwise, to incorporate this crime into cur-
rent Angolan law, there could have been no such crime at the time
the defendants were captured. The Geneva-based International
Commission of Jurists has noted that mercenarism should be but
is not yet a crime in international law. 146 These resolutions do
represent a current trend to condemn the activity of mercenaries.
Many States are recognizing mercenarism - like murder, piracy,
genocide - as a universal crime, one which so offends traditional
and universal notions of justice, human decency and proper con-
duct that all States may exercise legislative and enforcement juris-
diction over violators.
Specifically, U.N. Resolution 2395147 calls for measures to pre-
vent the recruitment or training of mercenaries in Portuguese
colonies. Resolution 2465,148 adopted in the same year (1968),
declares that using mercenaries against movements for national
liberation is punishable, that mercenaries are outlaws," and that
countries should legislate against such activities. Resolution
2548149 in 1969, and Resolution 3103150 in 1973 reaffirmed the
earlier declarations.
145 TIME, supra note 29, at 21.
146 N.Y. Times, Jul., 10, 1976, at 6, col. 4.
147 Supra note 68.
148 Supra note 69.
149 Supra note 70.
150 Supra note 71.
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OAU Resolution AHG/Res. 49(IV)151 urged all world nations
to enact laws declaring the recruitment and training of merce-
naries in their territories a punishable crime and deterring their
citizens from enlisting as mercenaries. Resolution CM/St. 6
(XVII)152 in Addis Ababa strongly reaffirmed the determination
of African peoples and States to take all necessary measures "to
eradicate from the African continent the scourge that the merce-
nary system represents" and called for the mobilization of world
opinion to ensure adoption of anti-mercenary legislation.
All of these Resolutions espouse general principles and aims
since certain concepts vary greatly among different legal systems
and might not be universally applicable. Instead, the precise
scope and substance of each right or crime is left to national legis-
lation. States ratifying these Resolutions undertake to protect
their people by law against the activity outlined in the particular
declaration.. Ratifying States which violate these Resolutions are
notified by the respective organizations of the violations, but
neither the OAU or the United Nations have effective enforce-
ment machinery, other than of ostracism by other member States.
In its search for international authority, the People's Revolu-
tionary Court apparently ignored certain provisions of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.153 For example,
Article 14(5) prescribes that everyone convicted of a crime has the
right to have his conviction reviewed by a higher court.154 The
Revolutionary Penal Code provided for no such appeal. Article
15(1)155 provides that no one shall be held guilty of an offense
on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
crime under national or international law at the time when it was
committed. As noted earlier, the law establishing the Court and pur-
porting to prescribe the punishable offenses within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court was enacted long after the defendants had been
captured.
1 51 Organization of African Unity Resolution 49 of the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa,
Congo, from 11 to 14 Sept. 1967.
152 Organization of African Unity Statement 6 of the Council of Ministers
meeting in its Seventeenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 21
to 23 June, 1971.
153 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR
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CONCLUSION
The Angola trial of mercenaries leaves much to be desired in
terms of what constitutes present international penal jurisprudence.
The judgment of the People's Revolutionary Court called atten-
tion to a political problem and to the need for effective legislation.
The procedural fairness of the trial was commendable, but the
countervailing substantive unfairness resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. With this trial as one poor example, it would seem es-
sential that future bodies affirm in advance the laws to be applied,
the rules of procedure to be followed and the nature of evidence
to be presented.
As members of the world community, all States must recog-
nize their mutual obligation to each other to uphold universal
standards of dignity, respect, equality and justice and not merely
to act in their own self-interest. All States must likewise require
of each other that these concepts of truth and justice and due pro-
cess of law be observed, to the end of eliminating the need for
laws of war. Emerging nations and established ones alike must be
reminded that their real self-interest is in the humane treatment
of all persons. Only if the international legal machinery strives
to this end can there be any hope of achieving the goal of peace
without resorting to the means of war.
MIKE J. HOOVER*
APPENDICES
The following are accurate representations of original docu-
ments reproduced by Lennox S. Hinds, member of International
Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries, in The Trial of the Mer-
cenaries June 7-19, 1976, A SPECIAL REPORT.
APPENDIX I
INDICTMENT
The PEOPLE'S PROSECUTOR of the PEOPLE'S REVO-
LUTIONARY COURT, - in the name of the ANGOLAN PEOPLE
and the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, makes the fol-
lowing INDICTMENT against: COSTAS GEORGIOU, known
as "CALLAN"; ANDREW GORDON McKENZIE, MALCOLM
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1978.
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McINTYRE, KEVIN JOHN MARCHANT, JOHN LAWLOR,
COLIN CLIFFORD EVANS, MICHAEL DOUGLAS WISE-
MAN, CECIL MARTIN FORTUIN, DEREK. JOHN BARKER,
JOHN JAMES NAMMOCK, GUSTAVO MARCELO GRILLO,
known as "GUS", DANIEL FRANCIS GEARHART and GARY
MARTIN ACKER, - all duly identified in the statements, for the
CRIME OF BEING MERCENARIES and for CRIMES AGAINST
PEACE, committed by enemies of the ANGOLAN PEOPLE and
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, in a mercenary war of
aggression carried out with the aim of extinguishing the independence
of the country, enslaving, oppressing, [sic] and dividing the ANGOLAN
PEOPLE and pillaging the natural resources of the territory for the
benefit of foreign, neocolonialist [sic] and imperialist interests.
FIRST
I consider the preliminary investigation of the case to be complete,
containing sufficient evidence of the punishable acts, and the identity
and responsibility of the authors, for the case to be the subject of a trial
by the PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COURT, the court compe-
tent to try this matter.
SECOND
At the end of 1975, faced with the victorious advance of FAPLA, the
National Army of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, which
was defeating the simultaneous and concerted attack of the racist South
African army, and the imperialist puppets FNLA and UNITA on all
fronts, the colluding forces of American imperialism, racist South
African fascism, bankrupt colonialism and the traitorous FNLA and
UNITA bands, with the support and complicity of governments subject
to the dictates of imperialism, decided to intensify the use of mer-
cenaries. This new and criminal warlike aggression was a vain attempt
to prevent the inexorable victory of the ANGOLAN PEOPLE, united
in the establishment, maintenance and progress of the PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
THIRD
To this end these forces undertook a shameful public recruitment cam-
paign in the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and BRITAIN,
through the mass media, to bring together ex-soldiers with military
experience in other wars of aggression.
FOURTH
Their front men, working as recruiters, were interviewed by television
and the press for publicity purposes, as is confirmed in relation to
JOHN BANKS and NICHOLAS HALL, called "NICK" HALL in
BRITAIN, and DAVE BUFKIN, GARY MARTIN ACKER and
LOBO DEL SOL in the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
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FIFTH
Offices were opened and functioned in NEW YORK and LON-
DON in which the interviews, contracting, classification and as-
sembling of mercenaries were done, to augment the criminal group
that were coming to attack the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
and the ANGOLAN PEOPLE.
SIXTH
These organised offices allocated the enlisted mercenaries, some with
experience gained in the criminal VIETNAM war and with training
in infantry, paratroops, transport, etc., to different services according
to their specialties.
SEVENTH
They contracted their criminal services against payment of a sum in
dollars or pounds sterling, as well as other pecuniary advantages.
EIGHTH
They negotiated the air transport of AFRICA of the recruited mer-
cenaries, they dealt with all emigration and customs formalities, such
as passports, visas, etc., (in which the diligent activities of the SECUR-
ITY ADVISORY SERVICES (SAS) organisation in BRITAIN is
notable), they assembled the mercenaries in previously arranged places,
such as the London hotels PARK COURT HOTEL and TOWER
HOTEL, sending them in different groups, some of more than a
hundred people, to KINSHASA via BRUSSELS, PARIS or ATHENS,
using SABENA AIRWAYS and AIR FRANCE planes.
NINTH
Shamefully, all this took place with every facility in broad daylight,
without any preventive or, at least, restraining action being taken by
the authorities of the countries where mercenary recruitment was
going on. This strikingly demonstrates the acquiescence and com-
plicity of the various governments particularly those of Britain and
America, in the preparation and development of the criminal con-
spiracy.
TENTH
In particular, so far as the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA is
concerned, it was clearly proved that the FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (FBI) had full knowledge and control over the
development of the mercenary recruitment operation.
ELEVENTH
When they had arrived in KINSHASA, ZAIRE, the mercenaries
were searched by customs officials at KINSHASA airport, and were
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interviewed by FNLA leaders of varying ranks, according to their po-
tential criminal capability. Later some of them were moved to the
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL.
TWELFTH
They next formed themselves into different groups, entrusting leader-
ship to certain of the mercenaries, and placing FNLA troops, whom they
pejoratively called "natives", under their command.
THIRTEENTH
The mercenaries were all armed and equipped with war material of
American, British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and Chinese origin,
by which is also shown the nature of the international "holy alliance"
which criminally armed these enemies of the ANGOLAN PEOPLE.
FOURTEENTH
Finally crossing the border from ZAIRE, where all facilities were given
to them by the border police, the mercenaries invaded the territory of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, where they carried out
the tasks which they had undertaken.
FIFTEENTH
They planted mines, made ambushes, caused the deaths of members
of the national army and committed numerous murders of civilians,
whom they also maltreated, insulted and harassed by their words and
deeds. Using explosives, they destroyed bridges, buildings, military
and civilian equipment and property. They set mines and traps along
the roads, and the tracks leading to the peasants' fields. They robbed
and looted.
SIXTEENTH
But they were defeated and captured by FAPLA with the help and
collaboration of the people. So many crimes and acts of destruction
cannot go unpunished. We will pass on to a description of the criminal
activity of each defendant.
SEVENTEENTH
COSTAS GEORGIOU, also known as "CALLAN" and "COLONEL
CALLAN", son of GEORGE GEORGIOU and HELEN GEOR-
GIOU, single, twenty-five years old, born in CYPRUS on 21st De-
cember 1951, a naturalized British citizen, resident of 66 Kendal House,
Priory Green Estate, London NI, Britain, with secondary education
level, ex-British Army paratrooper, with previous convictions for rob-
bery.
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EIGHTEENTH
He was recruited in LONDON in November 1975 by two people
known as BELFORD and TAYLOR, for the task of leading the con-
tracted mercenary troops to invade the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
ANGOLA and subjugate its people.
NINETEENTH
He crossed the border into the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
armed and in uniform, and in December 1975 he was in the NEGAGE
and CARMONA areas in the north of Angolan territory.
TWENTIETH
In the month of January 1976, the traitor HOLDEN ROBERTO
appointed him as head of the mercenary soldiers serving the FNLA
puppet band, after which he organised his troops into small groups,
to be able to carry out surprise attacks.
TWENTY-FIRST
As part of his criminal mercenary activity the defendant COSTAS
GEORGIOU, as head of a group of mercenaries and of groups of the
puppet FNLA organisation, carried out numerous criminal acts such
as:
a) Armed combat against FAPLA, the National army of the
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA;
b) Planting of minefields;
c) Destruction, by use of explosives, of bridges, buildings, military
and civilian equipment and property;
d) Murder of defenceless [sic] civilians, as well as the maltreatment,
insulting and harassment of civilians;
e) Murder, maltreatment, insulting and harassment of MPLA
members and FAPLA fighters taken prisoner;
f) Looting of goods and subsistence needs of the civilian population;
g) Mining and setting traps on the access routes to the people's
fields;
h) Murder of FNLA members;
i) Murder of other mercenaries.
TWENTY-SECOND
Among the many armed actions that he commanded and participated
in with his group, the attack on DAMBA on 1st February 1976 can
be singled out, as well as the ambush carried out against a FAPLA
column on 3rd February, near QUIBOCOLO.
TWENTY-THIRD
As a result of the latter action a number of FAPLA soldiers were
killed and wounded, and it was in the course of this action that the
defendant, using an American-made M-66 rocket launcher was wounded
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in the left leg when he was caught in the explosion which he himself
had caused by firing on a FAPLA truck loaded with explosives, which
he had taken for a tank.
TWENTY-FOURTH
The defendant COSTAS GEORGIOU, acting with furious anger,
killed defenceless [sic] people daily so as to inculcate terror, subjugate,
and take advantage of the people through whose areas he and his
group passed. He imposed his despotic power by force and violence,
and sowed panic and terror among the civilian population.
TWENTY-FIFTH
On 7th January 1976 he killed a civilian in SAO SALVADOR.
TWENTY-SIXTH
He killed an FNLA soldier in the SAO SALVADOR barracks.
TWENTY-SEVENTH
In the same town he struck five people dressed in civilian clothes,
and accused them of being soldiers because they were wearing boots.
These people were taken to the barracks where they disappeared.
TWENTY-EIGHTH
In QUIBOCCOLO he ordered the mercenary CHARLIE to elimi-
nate physically two FNLA soldiers, just because they appeared on
parade, without military uniform.
TWENTY-NINTH
In an advanced mercenary troop position near MAQUELA DO
ZOMBO, he tortured and murdered an MPLA messenger and another
member of the civilian population.
THIRTIETH
In the same place he robbed an FNLA soldier of his watch and money
and ordered CHARLIE to kill him immediately. He reprimanded the
latter for having used two bullets to kill the victim instead of one.
THIRTY-FIRST
Still in the same place, without previous discussion, he ordered
CHARLIE to kill another FNLA soldier who came to where he was.
THIRTY-SECOND
In the MAQUELA DO ZOMBO area, on 1st February 1976, he
murdered an English mercenary with three shots, shouting at the same
time: " . . . THIS IS THE LAW HERE . . .", and ordered his as-
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sistant SAM COPELAND to execute thirteen other British mer-
cenaries who wanted to return to ENGLAND, because of the vic-
torious advance of FAPLA. This mass murder occurred in the
presence of some of the rest of the mercenary soldiers and its objective
was clearly to intimidate them and compel them to continue their
mercenary activity.
THIRTY-THIRD
The defendant in his brief career as "hired killer", as the international
press justly described him, was shown by his activities to have a deep
hatred of the people and to be extremely racist. This showed in his
criminal behaviour, which also revealed his extreme contempt for human
life. His fascist mentality combined with his uncontrolled lust for ma-
terial wealth, made him kill men, women and children for sadism and
money.
THIRTY-FOURTH
The defendant tried to justify his crimes by saying that his victims were
undesirable elements, whether "natives", whom he considered an "in-
ferior race", thieves and opportunists; or the other mercenaries whom
he considered to be cowards because they did not dare to carry out
his criminal orders.
THIRTY-FIFTH
ANDREW GORDON McKENZIE, son of GORDON FINDLAY
McKENZIE and STELLA McKENZIE, single, twenty-five years
old, born in NORTH GRIMSBY, ENGLAND on 4th July 1950,
British citizen, resident at 47, Alexander Road, Aldershot, England,
with secondary level education, ex-British Army paratrooper.
THIRTY-SIXTH
He was recruited by JOHN BANKS in the middle of January 1976,
in a pub together with other mercenaries, the job arrangements later
being confirmed at the TOWER HOTEL, LONDON. According to
his contract, the defendant McKENZIE would receive 600 pounds
sterling per month to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggres-
sion against the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. He re-
ceived an advance of 500 dollars while he was still in LONDON.
THIRTY-SEVENTH
On the day following his interview in the above-mentioned hotel he
took a plane, with other mercenaries, to BRUSSELS and then on to
KINSHASA via ATHENS. In KINSHASA HE WAS SUP-




He crossed the border from ZAIRE into the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF ANGOLA, armed and in uniform, and went to SAO SALVADOR
with other mercenaries, around 20th January 1976. In this town the
group was divided, one section of the mercenaries continuing to SANTO
ANTONIO DO ZAIRE and the rest remaining in SAO SALVADOR
and MAQUELA DO ZOMBO with the defendant CALLAN.
THIRTY-NINTH
The defendant was part of the group named "killer group", com-
manded by the defendant CALLAN and of which, together with
other dead or disappeared mercenaries, the defendants McINTYRE,
MARCHANT, EVANS and WISEMAN were also a part.
FORTIETH
In his mercenary activity the defendant McKENZIE, being a right
hand man of the defendant CALLAN, carried out numerous criminal
acts, such as:
a)-Armed action against FAPLA, the national army of the PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA;
b)-Planting of minefields;
c)-Destruction, by the use of explosives, of bridges, buildings and
military and civilian equipment and property;
d)-Maltreatment, insults and harassment of the civilian population;
e)-Violation of homes and kidnapping of civilians, and their use as
hostages;
O-Stealing of property and subsistence needs of the civilian popula-
tion;
g)-Murder of other mercenaries.
FORTY-FIRST
Among the many other armed actions against the national Angolan army
in which he participated the attack on DAMBA on 1st February can be
singled out, as well as the ambush carried out against a FAPLA column
on 3rd February in QUIBOCOLO, as a result of which several wounded
and dead were caused among fighters of the national army.
FORTY-SECOND
With other mercenaries, and by using death threats, he occupied the
house of the peasants JAO ANTONIO and SENDA ISABEL. He
exercised physical and mental violence against SENDA ISABEL, who
was pregnant at the time. He kept the peasant couple prisoner and
with other occupants, took unwarranted advantage of them, their prop-
erty and the food in the house.
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FORTY-THIRD
Using the peasant couple as hostages he forced them, against their
patriotic conscience and by threatening to shoot them, to show him the
way to the nearest village, so that he could ensure the retreat of his
group, the commander of which, CALLAN, was wounded.
FORTY-FOURTH
As a right hand man of CALLAN, the defendant McKENZIE was pres-
ent and directly participated in the murder of the thirteen British mer-
cenaries on 1st February 1976, in the MAQUELA DO ZOMBO area,
already described in the previous article 32.
FORTY-FIFTH
MALCOLM McINTYRE, son of MONTAGUE WRIGHT and
DORIS WRIGHT, widower, twenty-six years old, born in PERTH,
SCOTLAND, on 22 June 1949, British citizen, resident at 37, Norwick
Walk, Basildon, Essex, England, with secondary level education and a
nursing qualification.
FORTY-SIXTH
He was recruited by JOHN BANKS and on 27th January 1976 was in-
terviewed and stayed in the PARK COURT HOTEL, where he was
contracted for the sum of 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds sterling
per week so that, as a mercenary, he could provide nursing care for the
mercenaries in ANGOLA. He received an advance of 150 pounds while
he was still in LONDON.
FORTY-SEVENTH
He left LONDON with a group of eighty mercenaries, bypassing all
emigration and customs formalities by presenting a simple form with his
photograph, that he had taken in the hotel, attached to it. He made a
stop in BRUSSELS and arrived in KINSHASA on 28th January 1976,
where he was supplied with a uniform and an FN rifle, made in Belgium.
FORTY-EIGHTH
He crossed the border of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
from ZAIRE, armed and in uniform, on 30th January 1976, going with
other mercenaries to SAO SALVADOR.
FORTY-NINTH
The defendant was part of the group called "killer group," directly un-
der the orders of CALLAN.
FIFTIETH
He participated in armed combats against FAPLA, national army of the
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, in particular the already
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mentioned combats in DAMBA and QUIBOCOLO, on 1st and 3rd
February 1976, in which the forces of the national army suffered several
dead and wounded.
FIFTY-FIRST
He also participated, as a member of the group already mentioned, in
the planting of mine fields, in destruction by use of explosives, of
bridges, buildings, military, and civilian equipment and property.
FIFTY-SECOND
He was part of the group which occupied the house of the peasants
JOAO ANTONIO and SENDA ISABEL, in the circumstances
mentioned previously.
FIFTY-THIRD
KEVIN JOHN MARCHANT, son of LESLIE MARCHANT and
MAY HILDA MARCHANT, married, twenty-five years of age, born
in EDGEWARE, MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND on 15th November
1950, British citizen, resident in HAMPSHIRE, ENGLAND with sec-
ondary level of education, ex-British army soldier.
FIFTY-FOURTH
He was recruited at the end of January 1976 by the "SECURITY AD-
VISORY SERVICES (SAS)," by the recruiting agent JOHN BANKS,
with a contract of £150 per week, to participate as a mercenary in the
war of aggression against the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
FIFTY-FIFTH
He left LONDON, as part of the group of 80 mercenaries referred
to above. He made a stop in BRUSSELS and arrived in KINSHASA
on 28th January 1976 where he was supplied with uniform and military
equipment.
FIFTY-SIXTH
He crossed the border into the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
from ZAIRE on 30th January 1976, going with the other mercenaries to
SAO SALVADOR.
FIFTY-SEVENTH
The defendent was part of the group known as the "Killer group" directly
under the orders of "CALLAN."
FIFTY-EIGHTH
He participated in armed combat against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, and in particular in the
combats already described, DAMBA and QUIBOCOLO on 1si and
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3rd February 1976 which caused the deaths and wounding of soldiers of
the national army.
FIFTY-NINTH
He also participated, with the group mentioned earlier, in the planting
of mine fields, and in the destruction by use of explosives, of bridges,
buildings, military and civilian equipment and property.
SIXTIETH
He was part of the group which occupied the house of the peasants JOAO
ANTONIO and SENDA ISABEL, in the circumstances already de-
scribed.
SIXTY-FIRST
JOHN LAWLOR, son of JOHN JOSEPH LAWLOR and CATH-
ERINE AGNES LAWLOR, single, twenty-three years of age, born in
FARNBOROUGH, ENGLAND on the 11th January 1953, British citi-
zen resident at 76, BROOM HILL ROAD, COVE, HAMPSHIRE,
ENGLAND, with secondary level of education, ex-British naval fusilier.
SIXTY-SECOND
He was recruited by JOHN BANKS, on 15th January 1976, after he
had been called on the telephone at home. He was contracted for the sum
of 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds sterling per week to participate
as a mercenary in the war of aggression against the PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF ANGOLA. He received 150 pounds as an advance while
he was still in LONDON.
SIXTY-THIRD
He left LONDON, as part of the group of 80 mercenaries already men-
tioned on 28th January 1976, transitting through BRUSSELS and ar-
rived in KINSHASA on 29th January 1976, where he was supplied
with uniform and military equipment.
SIXTY-FOURTH
At the end of January 1976 he crossed the border into the PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA from ZAIRE, armed and in uniform go-
ing to SAO SALVADOR with other mercenaries and staying there un-
der the orders of the co-defendant "CALLAN."
SIXTY-FIFTH
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, and in particular in the
combats at DAMBA and QUIBOCOLO on 1st and 3rd February




He also, with other mercenaries, participated in the planting of mine-
fields and used explosives to destroy bridges, buildings and military and
civilian equipment and property.
SIXTY-SEVENTH
He was a member of the group that occupied the house of the peasants
JOAO ANTONIO and SENDA ISABEL, in the above mentioned
circumstances.
SIXTY-EIGHTH
COLIN CLIFFORD EVANS, son of ROBERT EVANS and EDITH
EVANS, legally separated, twenty-eight years of age, born in HEMS-
WORTH, YORKSHIRE, ENGLAND on 17th February 1948, British
citizen resident at 11, CEDAR ROAD, CHICKENLEY, DEWS-
BURY, ENGLAND, with secondary level of education, ex-British
Army soldier.
SIXTY-NINTH
He was recruited in LONDON on 27th January 1976 by JOHN
BANKS, through SECURITY ADVISORY SERVICES (SAS), be-
ing contracted at 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds sterling per week
to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggression against the PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. He received an advance of 150
pounds in LONDON.
SEVENTIETH
He left LONDON in the group of 80 mercenaries referred to above,
transitting through BRUSSELS and arriving at KINSHASA on 29th
January 1976, where he was given a uniform and military equipment.
SEVENTY-FIRST
At the end of January 1976 he crossed the border into the PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA from ZAIRE, going to SAO SALVADOR
with other mercenaries.
SEVENTY-SECOND
The defendant was a member of the special commando group named
"KILLER GROUP" under the direct orders of "CALLAN."
SEVENTY-THIRD
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, and in particular in the
actions on 1st and 3rd February 1976, at DAMBA and QUIBOCOLO
from which the national army suffered dead and wounded.
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SEVENTY-FOURTH
He also, with other mercenaries, participated in the planting of mine-
fields and used explosives to destroy bridges, buildings and military
and civilian equipment and property.
SEVENTY-FIFTH
He was a member of the group that occupied the house of the peasants
JOAO ANTONIO and SENDA ISABEL, in the circumstances above
mentioned.
SEVENTY-SIXTH
MICHAEL DOUGLAS WISEMAN, son of PERCY DOUGLAS
WISEMAN and MARY GLYN, married, twenty-seven years of age,
born in FINCHLEY, LONDON, ENGLAND on 8th April 1949,
British citizen, resident at 87 Flamstead End Road, Cheshunt, Hertford-
shire, England, with secondary level education, ex-British Army soldier.
SEVENTY-SEVENTH
He was recruited in LONDON on 27th January 1976 by JOHN
BANKS, being contracted at 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds sterl-
ing per week to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggression
against the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
SEVENTY-EIGHTH
He left LONDON in the group of 80 mercenaries referred to above,
transitting through BRUSSELS and arriving at KINSHASA on 29th
January 1976, where he was supplied with a uniform and military
equipment.
SEVENTY-NINTH
At the end of January 1976 he crossed the border by road into the PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA from ZAIRE, armed and in uni-
form, going to SAO SALVADOR with the other mercenaries.
EIGHTIETH
The defendant was a member of the special commando group known
as "KILLER GROUP," under the direct orders of "CALLAN."
EIGHTY-FIRST
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, and in particular in the
combats at DAMBA and QUIBOCOLO on 1st and 3rd February 1976





He also, with other mercenaries, participated in the planting of mine-
fields and used explosives to destroy bridges, buildings and military
and civilian equipment and property.
EIGHTY-THIRD
He was a member of the group that occupied the house of the peasants
JOAO ANTONIO and SENDA ISABEL, in the circumstances
above mentioned.
EIGHTY-FOURTH
CECIL MARTIN FORTUIN, known as 'SCOTCH', son of JOHN
FORTUIN and DORIS FORTUIN, divorced, thirty-one years of age,
born in CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA, on 25th June 1944, natur-
alized British citizen, resident at 23 Naseby Road, Kettering, Northants,
England, ex-British Army paratrooper.
EIGHTY-FIFTH
He was recruited in LONDON on 23rd January 1976 by JOHN
BANKS to be his bodyguard, at 300 (three hundred) pounds sterling.
He did this job at the time the mercenaries were being called together
at the PARK COURT HOTEL in LONDON on 27th January 1976.
EIGHTY-SIXTH
He left LONDON in the group of 80 mercenaries on 28th January 1976,
transitting through BRUSSELS and arriving at KINSHASA on 29th
January 1976, where he was supplied with a uniform and military equip-
ment.
EIGHTY-SEVENTH
On the same day, 29th January 1976, accompanying JOHN BANKS,
he joined an escort force for the traitor HOLDEN ROBERTO who
was going to SAO SALVADOR.
EIGHTY-EIGHTH
At the end of January 1976 he crossed the border from ZAIRE into the
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, armed and in uniform.
EIGHTY-NINTH
In SAO SALVADOR he joined the mercenary forces and was sent to
the advanced post established by CALLAN on the MAQUELA QUI-
BOCOLO road.
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NINETIETH
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, in particular in the at-
tack on DAMBA on 1st February 1976, already described, from which
the national army suffered dead and wounded.
NINETY-FIRST
He also participated in the planting of minefields and used explosives
to destroy bridges, buildings and military and civilian equipment and
property.
NINETY-SECOND
DEREK JOHN BARKER, son of GEORGE BARKER and ANN
BARKER, divorced, thirty-four years old, born in BIRMINGHAM,
ENGLAND on 1st August 1941, British citizen, resident at 47 Alexan-
der Road Aldershot, England, with secondary level education, ex-British
Army paratrooper, with a long criminal record.
NINETY-THIRD
He was recruited by JOHN BANKS on 16th January 1976, in the bar
of the QUEEN'S HOTEL, in ALDERSHOT, ENGLAND, being con-
tracted for the sum of 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds sterling a
week to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggression against the
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
NINETY-FOURTH
He left LONDON with a group of mercenaries by passing emigration
and customs formalities by means of presenting a simple form with his
photograph on it, taken in the hotel, thanks to the intervention of "SE-
CURITY ADVISORY SERVICES (SAS)." He arrived at KIN-
SHASA on 19th January 1976, having transitted through BRUSSELS
and ATHENS.
NINETY-FIFTH
At KINSHASA he had meetings with the traitor HOLDEN ROBER-
TO, and was supplied with a uniform and military equipment.
NINETY-SIXTH
On 20th January 1976 he crossed the land border into the PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, and went with other mercenaries to SAO
SALVADOR, where he was appointed "Captain" and stationed in
SANTO ANTONIO DO ZAIRE. Later he took on command of this
zone.
NINETY-SEVENTH
At SANTO ANTONIO DO ZAIRE he gave military traning to




He was in charge of maintaining the occupation of that martyred town
by mercenary and puppet troops, who oppressed, coerced and humili-
ated the civilian population.
NINETY-NINTH
He planned, organised and executed a number of military actions, with
reconnaissance missions, planting of mines, destruction of bridges and
communication routes aimed at preventing the liberation of the town by
FAPLA.
HUNDREDTH
This stubborn resistance resulted in dead and wounded for the national
army forces, and the destruction of military and civilian equipment and
property.
HUNDRED AND FIRST
JOHN JAMES NAMMOCK, son of WILLIAM NAMMOCK and
NOREEN NAMMOCK, bachelor, twenty years old, born in LONDON
on 6th November 1955, Irish citizen, resident at 183 Homefield House,
Hazelwood Crescent, London W10, England, with secondary level edu-
cation, reserve paratrooper.
HUNDRED AND SECOND
He was recruited in LONDON in January 1976 by JOHN BANKS,
being contracted for the sum of 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds
sterling a week to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggression
against the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. He received an
advance in LONDON of 150 (one hundred and fifty) pounds sterling.
HUNDRED AND THIRD
He left LONDON on 8th February, part of a group of twenty-five
mercenaries who had gathered on 4th February 1976 at the POST
HOUSE HOTEL, and transitting through BRUSSELS and ATHENS
arrived at KINSHASA on the following day, where he was given a
uniform and military equipment.
HUNDRED AND FOURTH
On 9th February he crossed the border into the PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF ANGOLA from ZAIRE, with other mercenaries going to
SAO SALVADOR on board a plane belonging to the Angolan airline
TAAG, illegally in the possession of FNLA.
HUNDRED AND FIFTH
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army
of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, for which he volun-
teered.
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HUNDRED AND SIXTH
In particular he took part in reconnaissance patrols, as radio operator,
and participated in an action against FAPLA on 13th February 1976 in
which he was wounded and captured.
HUNDRED AND SEVENTH
GUSTAVO MARCELO GRILLO, also known as "GUS," son of
LUIS GRILLO and LAURA POLLECHI GRILLO, bachelor, twenty-
seven years old, born at BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA on 2nd
August 1949, naturalised North American, resident at 935, Garfield
Avenue, Jersey City, New Jersey, United States of America, with
secondary level education, ex-"marine," Vietnam war veteran, with pre-
vious convictions for "racketeering."
HUNDRED AND EIGHTH
Following the publicity campaign promoted on Channel 7 of the Ameri-
can television network ABC by David BUFKIN, also a Vietnam war
veteran, he was contracted in January 1976 for the sum of 2,000 (two
thousand) dollars a month to participate as a mercenary in the war of ag-
gression against the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. He re-
ceived 1,000 (one thousand) dollars as an advance on his arrival in
KINSHASA.
HUNDRED AND NINTH
With six other mercenaries who gather on 5th February 1976 at the SKY
VIEW HOTEL, NEW YORK, he left NEW YORK on 6th February,
arriving at KINSHASA the following day via PARIS.
HUNDRED AND TENTH
On 10th February 1976 he crossed the land border into the PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA from ZAIRE, armed and in uniform, going
to SAO SALVADOR.
HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH
In SAO SALVADOR he organised the security positions at the mer-
cenary headquarters.
HUNDRED AND TWELFTH
He commanded a combat unit composed of Americans, British and
about three hundred and sixty Angolans, members of the puppet FNLA
organisation, having given the latter military training.
HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of




He organised the defence of SAO SALVADOR, mining and setting
traps on the access routes to the town, and commanded reconnaissance
patrols.
HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH
On 13th February 1976 he was captured during a combat with FAPLA,
having offered resistance by firing on the national army forces, which
suffered losses.
HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH
The defendant recalls with pride having participated in the criminal
Vietnam war and having committed war crimes there, such as the de-
struction of villages, cultivated land and the means of subsistence, and
the deportation of the civilian population. He planned to use these
criminal methods in ANGOLA.
HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH
DANIEL FRANCIS GEARHART, son of DANIEL MONTGOMERY
GEARHART and PAULINE ELIZABETH GEARHART, married,
thirty-four years old, born in WASHINGTON, DC, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA on 9th November 1941, North American Nationality,
resident at 3021, Fayette Road, Kessington [sic], Maryland, United
States of America, with secondary level education, Vietnam war veteran.
HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH
He offered himself as a mercenary, placing an advertisement to this ef-
fect in various newspapers and journals, among which was "THE SOL-
DIER OF FORTUNE," a magazine specialising in mercenary affairs,
published in the United States of America.
HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH
He was recruited in the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA by DAVID
BUFKIN, being contracted at 1,200 (one thousand two hundred) dollars
a.month to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggression against
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH
He left NEW YORK for'KINSHASA at the time and in the circum-
stances described in relation to the defendant GRILLO.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST
[O]n 10th February 1976 he crossed the land border into the PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA from ZAIRE, armed and in uniform, go-
ing to SAO SALVADOR.
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HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND
He commanded a combat section, and gave military training to FNLA
troops.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH
He participated in the defence of SAO SALVADOR, mining and set-
ting traps on the access routes, and taking part in reconnaissance pa-
trols.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH
On 13th February 1976, he was captured during a combat with FAPLA,
after offering resistance by firing on the national army forces, which
suffered losses.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH
GARY MARTIN ACKER, son of CARL MARTIN ACKER and
JOYCE ACKER, bachelor, twenty-one years old, born at SACRA-
MENTO, CALIFORNIA on 25th October 1954, North American na-
tionality, resident at 2342, Cork Circle, Sacramento, California 95822
USA, secondary level education, ex-"marine" Vietnam war veteran.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH
He was recruited in CALIFORNIA in November 1975, by DAVID
BUFKIN, being contracted for 1,200 (one thousand two hundred) dol-
lars a month to participate as a mercenary in the war of aggression
against the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH
He collaborated directly in the recruitment of other mercenaries, by
participating in the publicity campaign through television interviews,
and by organising registration cards for the mercenary applicants.
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH
He left NEW YORK for KINSHASA, at the time and in the circum-
stances already described in relation to the defendants GRILLO and
GEARHART.
HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH
On 10th February 1976 he crossed the land border into the PEOPLE'S





He participated in mounting the security positions at the mercenary
headquarters in SAO SALVADOR, and gave military training to FNLA
troops.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND
He participated in armed actions against FAPLA, the national army of
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, in particular in recon-
naissance actions, and mounted the security positions for the group
of mercenaries who went to mine a bridge over CUIMBA.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD
On 14th February he was wounded and captured in a combat with
FAPLA, after offering resistance by firing on the national army forces,
who suffered losses.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH
The facts described in the first part of this indictment consistantly
show voluntary enlistment, for a sum of money in wages, apart from
any other pecuniary advantages, to participate in a war of aggression
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, in the service of neo-colonial-
ism and imperialism, and with the aim of subjecting the ANGOLAN
PEOPLE to a regime of exploitation, oppression and degradation. The
facts constitute the CRIME OF BEING A MERCENARY, as is
specifically set out in the STATEMENT OF THE HEADS OF
STATES AND GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES OF
THE OAU - ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY - held in
KINSHASA, in 1967; in the STATEMENT ON MERCENARY AC-
TIVITIES IN AFRICA, ADDIS ABEBA [sic] 1971, and RESOLU-
TIONS NO. 2395 (XXIII), 2465 (XXIII), 2548 (XXIV), and 3103
(XXVII) OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH
All of the defendants are authors of this crime by their direct action and full
consciousness of its illegality, and because of their conduct.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH
The facts described in the first part of this indictment in addition to
being a part of a war of aggression promoted by imperialism against
the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA also can constitute
CRIMES AGAINST PEACE, as described in the STATUTE OF
NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, and
confirmed by UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION NO. 95 (I) of
the 11th December 1946 and by the UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF 1974.
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HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH
All the defendants are actual authors of this crime, since they voluntar-
ily and consciously carried it out.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH
The crime of being mercenaries and crimes against peace were extreme-
ly serious in the way they were committed: armed violation of the bor-
der; combat action against the FAPLA, the national army of Angola,
which resulted in dead and wounded; the destruction of bridges, com-
munication routes, military and civilian equipment and property; setting
of mines and traps in tracks leading to peasants fields; murders, mal-
treatment, insults and harassment of members of the civilian popu-
lation; murder of MPLA members; of other mercenaries and of FNLA
soldiers; kidnapping of civilians and stealing of their property, all of
which are detailed in relation to each of the accused in the first part of
the indictment.
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINETH [sic]
The crimes committed by the defendants and previously attributed to
each and every one of them are characterised in the international princi-
ples cited and in current penal law, as extremely grievous crimes and,
both by their character as war crimes and by their being committed by
enemies of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA and the
ANGOLAN REVOLUTION they should be punished within the terms
of the COMBATANTS DISCIPLINARY LAW, 10th July 1966,
CHAPTER III, SECTION C NO. 9, and SECTION D NO. 10,
LINE H, with the DEATH PENALTY.
HUNDRED AND FORTIETH
As proof of the present indictment the following agencies are used:
A) CONFESSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS
B) WITNESSES
1. Manuel Fernandes Barros
2. Mishria Joao
3. Joio Ant6nio
4. Garcia Juama Kenene Giangue
5. Jos6 Afonso Carlos
6. Afonso Heriques Mois~s
7. Ant6nio Joaquim Sumba
8. Rafil Balaca
9. Nelson Gustavo dos Santos Gaspar
10. Anibal Rodrigues Moreira Palhares, J(inior
11. Senda Isabel
12. Pedro No6 Kediamosiko
13. Joaquim Pinto Jfinior
14. Miguel David
15. Luis Candido Cordeiro
16. Vasco Arnaldo Guimar~es de Castro
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17. Ako Joseph Nai
18. Venincio da Silva Lambo
19. Augusto Manuel
20. Jose do Espirito Santo Jord~o
21. Rui Guilherme Cardoso de Matos
C. EXPERTS EVIDENCE:
1. Report of Psychiatric doctors:
1.1. Ant6nio Jos6 Pereira Africano Neto
1.2. Reinaldo Correia Frimino Greg6rio
2. Report of Clinical doctors:
2.1. Maria do Rosario Rodriguez
2.2. Raul Pedro Hendrik da Silva
3. Report of the Forensic doctors:
3.1. Carlos Alberto da Silva Lopes
3.2. Raul Pedro Hendrik da Silva
D. OTHER PROOFS ARISING FROM THE CASE.
THE PEOPLE'S PROSECUTOR
/s/
Manuel Rui Alves Monteiro
CONCLUSION
On the twenty-sixth day of May nineteen hundred and seventy-six I
make the concluding report.
Clerk
1- As a result of the evidence shown in the reports, I decide that the
case should proceed so that the defendants: COSTA GEORGIOU,
ANDREW GORDON McKENZIE, MALCOLM McINTYRE,
KEVIN JOHN MARCHANT, JOHN LAWLOR, COLIN CLIF-
FORD EVANS, MICHAEL DOUGLAS WISEMAN, CECIL
MARTIN FORTUIN, DEREK JOHN BARKER, JOHN JAMES
NAMMOCK, GUSTAVO MARCELO GRILLO, DANIEL
FRANCIS GEARHART and GARY MARTIN ACKER, shall be
brought to trial, for an inquiry into their criminal responsibility.
I therefore charge them with the facts named in the indictment
made by the Comrade People's Prosecutor, which are as if reproduced
here, and which I offer as an integral part of this notice of charges,
and as facts that principally comprise the crime of being a mercenary
and crimes against peace.
The Court also takes note that the defendants were part of a stable
and organized group and were all conscious of the fact that this group
had been constituted to commit crimes within the borders of the People's
Republic of Angola.
2- As official defense counsel for the defendants CALLAN, CECIL
MARTIN AND DEREK BARKER I designate comrade EDGAR
FRANCISCO VALES; for the defendants McKENZIE, WISE-
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MAN, MARCHANT and NAMMOCK, comrade MARIA TERE-
SINHA LOPES; and for the defendants McINTYRE, EVANS and
LAWLOR, comrade FERNANDO LUIS DA SILVA, that is JOSE
SOARES DA SILVA.
3- The defendants shall be notified:
-of the text of the indictment and of this notice of charges, copies of
which must be given to them
-of the identity of their appointed defense
-that they are free to appoint a lawyer or defender of their choice up to
the day of trial
-that the case file can be consulted freely by their defense lawyers,
nominated or chosen, during a period of eight days
-that, during the eight day period, they can present their defense in
writing, indicating, if they wish, the witnesses and other means of proof
that will be presented at the trial, as well as raising any other relevant
questions.
Luanda, 26th May 1976
PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
APPENDIX II
VERDICT
[1] The honorable People's Prosecutor in this Tribunal has pre-
sented the case against the defendants COSTAS GEORGIOU, known
as "CALLAN", ANDREW GORDON McKENZIE, MALCOLM
McINTYRE, KEVIN JOHN MARCHANT, JOHN LAWLOR,
COLIN CLIFFORD EVANS, MICHAEL DOUGLAS WISE-
MAN, CECIL MARTIN FORTUIN, DEREK JOHN BARKER,
JOHN JAMES NAMMOCK, all of British nationality, and GUS-
TAVO MARCELO GRILLO, known as "GUS", DANIEL FRANCIS
GEARHEART [sic] and GARY MARTIN ACKER, citizens of
the United States of America and all, together with the others, signa-
tories of their statements, having charged them with committing crimes
of mercenarism and against peace, because, and in his view, the de-
fendants, together with many others, were recruited as mercenaries in
Great Britain and the United States of America, through specialised
agencies which operated there freely and with the consent of the
authorities of these two countries, having been transported by air to the
capital of Zaire, where, with the complicity of the government of that
country, they were outfitted with uniforms and military equipment.
[2] Once they had been thus outfitted, the defendants, in the
company of others, crossed the Angolan border illegally, and, putting
themselves at the side of the puppet F.N.L.A. group, whose troops
[Vol. 9: 323
MERCENARY TRIALS
they commanded, they laid mines, made ambushes, destroyed bridges,
buildings, property and military equipment, caused losses in the na-
tional army and ill-treated, harassed and carried out mass murders of
the civilian population.
[3] Hence, still in his view, they had to be brought to trial to be
subjected to the rigour of the law.
[4] The indictment having been heard, the legal proceedings, with-
out omissions or nullity, followed their legal course, the defendants,
through their defence counsel, having presented their defence and put
forward their evidence, all of which was noted by the Tribunal.
[5] And the trial having been held, with full respect for the forms
of legal procedure, it is now the duty of the Tribunal to pronounce
itself.
[6] CONSEQUENTLY:
1. From a critical assessment of the evidence, it has been found that
in Camberley, Surrey, Great Britain, there is a legally existing agency,
registered on 14 August 1975, which operates under the registered name
of "Security Advisory Services", and which uses the abbreviation
S.A.S., which initials, by calculated coincidence, are absolutely identi-
cal to those of the "Special Air Service", a top section of the British
armed forces.
[7] The said agency is run by John Banks, an ex-paratrooper,
Leslie Aspin, a gun-runner and British secret service agent, and Frank
Perren, an ex-marine, assisted by Terence Haig, a so-called F.N.L.A.
spokesman in England. It was Haig who admitted that the agency
handled incredible sums of money coming from the United States of
America, "but not from any private company in that country," - see p.
1093 - and funds channeled through President Mobutu of Zaire - see
pp. 1103, 1129 and also the "Sunday Times" of 25-1-76 and "The
Times" of 4-2-76. James Hilton, another person having links with the
organisation, corroborated that the agency had at its disposal 42 million
dollars coming from the United States of America - see p. 1100 and also
the British paper "The Morning Star" of 29-1-76. The money reached
the coffers of S.A.S. through messengers from Zaire, from a doctor in
Leeds, through bank transfers made in Belgium through the Zaire
embassy in London - see p. 1120 and "The Observer" of 1-2-76. At the
same time, Gerald Ford, president of the United States, in a filmed
interview given to Tom Brokaw, an NBC reporter, on 3 January 1976,
confirmed that American federal government funds were being -diverted
to the war in Angola, since the United States was co-operating with
friendly countries engaged in the Angolan conflict - see p. 1020.
[8] Furthermore, a secret report drawn up by the National Security
Studies Centre in Washington D.C. [sic] Vol. I, No. I, reported that the
CIA, coming to Holden Roberto's help, had just invested a further 50
million dollars in the Angolan conflagration, and this within the frame-
work of direct United States involvement in that conflict.
[9] This open intervention in the tragic events in Angola had
been recommended by the top secret "40 Committee", headed, among
others, by Kissinger and William Colby, CIA director, and was a part of
the "New Look" of American foreign policy, which, as a result of the
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debacle in Vietnam, was intended "to change the colour of the corpses"
- see p. 996.
[10] Thus, the facts indicate that the S.A.S. was a CIA subsidiary
in Great Britain.
[11] Did the British government know this? S.A.S. did its mer-
cenary agency advertising in newspapers and over the radio. The
departure of the recruited mercenaries was given sensational coverage
by the press. The London police organised and protected a meeting
of mercenaries in the basement of a church at Tower Hamlets, East
London, on the amiable pretext that they were a film team. At London
Airport there was no control of any kind, it being sufficient for the mer-
cenaries without passports merely to show a paper with the S.A.S.
initials on it to be able to pass freely through the exit doors.
[12] What is more, Harold Wilson made it clear that he knew about
the recruiting of mercenaries and that it involved "vast sums" of
money and correct lists of British military units, although he refused
to answer the question as to whether or not he thought the CIA was
involved in the business.
[13] However, the CIA involvement had been publicly revealed
by John Banks himself, who had pointed out that the liaison agent was
one Major James F. Leonard, assistant military attach& at the American
embassy in London since June 1973 - see pp. 1142 and 1120, "The
Times" of 23-2-76 and "The Observer" of 1-2-76.
[14] Therefore, how can there be any doubt about the active
complicity of the British Government, at a time, moreover, when that
government was officially calling for the recruitment of forces for
Israel?
[15] It is therefore clear that the major capitalist powers were
agreeing among themselves on a programme for the overthrow of the
People's Republic of Angola and that, having realised that direct mili-
tary intervention was unviable, they resorted to private armies. Which
they regimented, armed and paid. And the defendants were in fact
the instruments for the action of this political orchestration!
[16] But it was the S.A.S. agency that proceeded to recruit mer-
cenaries for Rhodesia and mercenaries for Angola. The latter num-
bered 128 and, divided into two groups, they were sent to Kinshasa
via Brussels.
[17] And the agency was preparing to send 500 more mercenaries
the following fortnight.
[18] These mercenaries were contracted for a period of six months
at a rate of pay of 150 pounds a week paid in American dollars, and
their job, on the battlefronts or as members of military support groups,
was to join the forces of the anti-nationalist F.N.L.A. group for the
purpose of helping to overthrow the legitimate government of the young
People's Republic of Angola, that is, to ensure that the F.N.L.A., using
violent means therefore, should gain political control of the country.
[19] All the defendants were perfectly conscious of that mission!
[20] 2 - In the United States of America, the mercenary agency
work for Angola and Rhodesia was done mainly by one David Bufkin,
a man involved with an illustrated publication devoted to promoting
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the myth of mercenarism and called "Soldier of Fortune". And the
advertising for the agency work was done in that magazine as well as in
newspapers and on television. Approved candidates were sent to
Kinshasa, via Paris or Brussels, and under the tutelage of the Zaire
embassy in Washington - see p. 517.
[21] At the same time, the F.B.I. had precise knowledge about this
traffic in war prostitutes - see p. 114 - and did nothing to disturb it.
[22] The defendants with American passports were thus contracted
by Bufkin, for a monthly pay of 1200 dollars, tax free and supplemented
by various cash bonuses.
[23] They were quite conscious that they were coming to Angola to
join the military forces of the F.N.L.A., whose design and venture
was directed towards the sanguinary seizure of political power.
[24] 3 - Inside the borders of Angola, the mercenaries destroyed
bridges, buildings and communication lines, smashed property and in-
dustrial equipment, -and plundered vehicles, money and crops. They
mined fields and paths, separated families and spread fear, shame and
outrage. Their legend was wrought with rape, sacking, wrongful ar-
rests, burnings, torture and unwarranted killing. Along the paths they
used, in the villages they occupied, they left behind them a trail of
dead with wide open eyes, charred hopes, stomachs cut open with
bayonets, children mangled by shells and the living filled with dread.
[25] It was an orgy of contempt!
[26] But it is a charismatic principle of socialist law, and not of it
alone, that penal responsibility must be individualised in terms of guilt.
[27] Moreover, this principle is expressly affirmed in the Inter-
national Pact on Civil and Political Rights.
[28] Hence the importance of specifying what demerit there has in
fact been in the activity of each of the defendants.
[29] All of them put on uniforms and carried a weapon to fight
the legitimate government of a free and sovereign foreign country
recognised by the community of nations.
[30] All of them consciously and deliberately violated the border
of Angola and took part in combat actions within the national territory.
[31] All the defendants were also conscious that they were part of
a stable and organised group which was on the fringe of the law and
geared to achieve a political plan to be carried out by criminal means.
[32] They therefore constituted a conspiracy, which is punishable
under all evolved penal systems - see Art. 263 of the Penal Code in force.
[33] With regard to defendant Callan, an ex-paratrooper in the
British army who was sentenced to imprisonment in his country for an
assault on a post office, he had the military command of all the anti-
national forces stationed in northern Angola and worked very closely with
the president of the so-called F.N.L.A. And because some of his men
had fired at a vehicle on the mistaken supposition that it was an enemy
vehicle, defendant Callan, after having relieved them of their weapons
and clothing, shot one of them and ordered the execution of the remain-
ing thirteen. The mass execution took place at 11 a.m. on 1 February
1976, and defendant McKenzie took part in it, as an author of it.
[34] But it is worth while knowing how the slaughter took place:
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"He lined them up on the edge of a valley, a little tiny valley, told
them to run down into the valley. He ordered the English troops to
open fire and they all massed about with their weapons and he cut the
lot of them using a sub-machine gun. He didn't kill any of them but
blew a lot of people, and as . . . you know . . . as he opened up all their
stomachs, blew their arms off, and with all of that eleven guys were
literally blown to pieces but still alive, and Copeland again was walking
up to them saying . . . you know . . . a guy was saying kill me kill
me and Copeland was saying: 'want to die?', so he said: 'yea', and he
said: 'Alright, so shoot him' . . . you know." - testimony of mercenary
Chris Dempster p. 685.
[35] Apart from the 14 British mercenaries, Callan also killed two
Angolans, both of them prisoners, as he himself confessed.
[36] And he also killed a third, with a shot in the mouth, for having
committed rape, according to the testimony of John Banks, who said
he was present. Most of the witnesses called at the trial spoke of the
wave of murders carried out by Callan, and it was the British mercenaries
themselves, his companions in arms, who classified him as "a homicidal
maniac, who spent a lot of time killing blacks just for fun" - see p. 1142.
[37] Defendant McKenzie, one of the main persons who carried
out what Callan willed, took an active part in the massacre of the British
mercenaries, whom he shot in cold blood, without any concern for giving
them a quick death. He is also guilty of threatening and beating civilians.
[38] Defendant Derek Barker was the head of the military garrison
at Santo Antonio da Zaire.
[39] And defendant Gearheart [sic], a veteran from Vietnam,
where he served in the American army security section, offered himself
as a mercenary in a strange advertisement published in "Soldier of
Fortune", and sent 10 dollars to the "Wild Geese Club", a club of
mercenaries which has as its high priest the notorious Mike Hoare,
responsible for the mass slaughters in the Congo. Contrary to what is
claimed by the defendant, the "Wild Geese Club" is not an informa-
tion agency and, as can be gathered from p. 450 of the case file, the
ten dollars he sent were intended for his admission as a member of that
sinister organisation.
[40] What is more, the defendant entered Kinshasa identifying
himself as a businessman, and he had a solid political education and good
general cultural level. During the medical examination, documented
on p. [illegible] the defendant described himself as a student of psy-
chology and history.
[41] And although there still remain doubts as to the true reasons
for the presence in the north of the country, there are no doubts that he
is a highly dangerous character.
[42] Defendant Grillo, a Vietnam war veteran, has a good cultural
level and behaved with intense malice. Accentuated malice was also
noted in [illegible] of defendants:
Marchant and Wiseman
[43] With regard to defendants Nammock, Acker and McIntyre,




[44] Some of the defendants also mined bridges and roads and
destroyed property and equipment. It is understood, however, that
such acts came within the concept of military operations, so that they
are not in themselves sufficient to characterise or fulfil the legal pro-
visions for a crime against the peace.
[45] As regards the holding under duress of the peasants Antonio
and Senda Isabel, with which some of the defendants are charged, it
is true that the defendants offered them a watch and a certain sum of
money to compensate for the losses they had sustained. Such an offer
diminishes malice, which is an essential element in the crime of private
dentention. Even had this not been so, however, the episode happened
in the disorder of the military retreat, and the defendants effected the
detention. Even had this not been so, however, the episode happened
in short, they could always have used the excuse of necessity.
B.-But it is now important to look into the applicable law.
[46] Mercenarism was not unknown in traditional penal law, where
it was always dealt with in relation to homicide.
[47] It was said, in a brief definition, that a mercenary was an
agent who committed a crime for wages. The prime motive for the
crime was therefore always the feeling of greed, which is moreover the
reason for the severe moral condemnation this type of crime has always
incurred.
[48] And mercenary homicide, then known as assassination, was
treated as a special crime in some legislation, while in others it was seen
as a form of premeditated homicide.
[49] In all cases, however, severe punishment was always attached
to mercenary homicide.
[50] And certainly throughout the 19th century, there was much
debate on whether the most serious penalty should fall on the head of
the mercenary, that is on he who carried out the crime, or on that of the
person interested in the carrying out of the crime, that is, on he who paid
for it to be committed.
[51] The debate ended in parity. In fact, the view prevailed that
the moral author of the crime was as responsible as the physical author.
[52] Therefore, this Tribunal does not heed the note often struck
by the defence that it was not the defendants who were those most
responsible for the crimes they committed, but governments and or-
ganisations which, for pecuniary compensation, made them commit
such offences.
[53] Yet it is important that in modern penal law, and in the field
of comparative law, the mercenary crime lost all autonomous existence
and was seen as a common crime, generally speaking aggravated by the
profit motive which prompts it. And this mercenary crime, which is
known today as "paid crime to order", comes within the laws on criminal
complicity, it being through them that the responsibility of he who orders
and he who is ordered is evaluated.
[54] In our case, mercenarism is provided for in Art. 20 No. 4 of
the Penal Code in force.
1977]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
[55] This annuls the objection of the defence that the crime of
mercenarism has not been defined and that there is no penalty for it.
[56] It is in fact provided for with penalty in most evolved penal
systems. As a material crime, of course!
[57] Previously in Congo and Biafra. Only yesterday in Angola.
Today in Rhodesia.
[58] In the convulsed history of the past 20 years, and always
serving neo-colonial plans, there have always been packs of dogs of war
with blood-stained muzzles, engaged in acts of aggression, in crimes
against peace and against humanity, decapitating or trying to decapitate
revolutions, wrecking or trying to wreck the freedom of peoples . . .
Therefore, they have been systematically involved in the commission of
international crimes.
[59] And misunderstanding arises when it is proposed and de-
manded that habitual criminals in the commission of international crime
be punished under internal law.
[60] Looking back at its wounds of yesterday, Africa feels that
mercenaries are a danger to peace for its children and to the security
of its states.
[61] And since these values undoubtedly merit legal protection,
the only realistic way to protect them is to regard mercenarism, war
to order, as a formal crime.-
[62] Hence those who commit the crime of mercenarism, in its
consummate form, are all those who, for personal profit, enlist in a
group or in forces intending, by military means, to counter the achieve-
ment of a foreign people's self-determination or, by the same means,
to impose neo-colonial designs on them.
[63] Finally, mercenarism is considered a crime in the view of
nations, and is expressly stated to be one in resolutions 2395 (XXIII),
2465 (XXIII), 2548 (XXIV) and 3103 (XXVII) of the General Assembly
of the United Nations Organisation, and in OAU statements - Kinshasa
1967, and Addis Ababa 1971.
[64] And acceptance is given to the allegation of the defence that
the defendants are not solely guilty. Also guilty, alongside them, are
the governments of the countries of which they are nationals, which
encouraged their recruitment, armed them and paid them wages.
Governments persisting in their racist philosophies and blinded by
imperial delirium, which have disregarded UN resolution 2465, and
again shown themselves to be against peace for the peoples and un-
worthy of sharing the company of the community of civilised nations.
[65] Furthermore, the Code of Discipline of the Combatant states
expressly that capital punishment is applicable to "enemies". And
mercenaries are uncontestably enemies!
[66] Art. 58 of the Angolan Constitutional Law says that laws and
regulations in force on 11 November 1975, the date of national in-
dependence, will continue to be applicable so long as they are not re-
voked. And the Code of the Combatant has not been revoked.
[67] Finally, it should be pointed out that the defendants cannot
claim the status of prisoners of war, for the definitive reason that they
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are irregular members of an army. And it is already on record that in
U.N. resolutions a mercenary is regarded as a common criminal.
[68] It is in these terms that all the defendants are considered
guilty of the crimes of mercenarism and conspiracy. Defendants Callan
and McKenzie, in addition to those crimes, are guilty of that of homocide.
[69] It is understood that having had a military command consti-
tutes an aggravating circumstance.
[70] To judge is, fundamentally, to testify in favour of man.
[71] Therefore, from amid the turmoil of immediate feelings, the
tumult of ideas, the redemption proposed by both churches and gen-
darmes [sic], over and above the crests of this agitated sea swell, it is
necessary, in short, to find again a certain concept of the dignity of man
and of the contingencies which can effect it.
[72] At the same time, peace is not the absence of war, but the
presence of justice.
[73] And justice ends where involvement in contempt and op-
pression begins . . .
[74] Strangers with knives between their teeth, the mercenaries,
came to carve dark wounds along the face of this country. Spreading
their sanguinary calculations, they violated children, plundered crops,
burned schools, ruined hopes and silenced with bullets the clear laughter
of the youth.
[75] And their purpose was to make an entire people return to the
frontiers of fear and shame. An invincible and unvanquished people,
for whom the greatest wealth lies on the paths of fraternity and in the
grave honour of being upright.
This is the crime put to the conscience of this Tribunal!
[76] Consequently, the judges of this Tribunal agree on the
judgement of the. guilty mercenaries, and in the name of the People's
Republic of Angola, sentence as follows; -
[77] The defendants Nammock, Acker and McIntyre to 16 years
imprisonment.
[78] The defendants Lawlor, Evans and Fortuin to 24 years im-
prisonment.
[79] The defendants Wiseman, Marchant and Grillo to 30 years
imprisonment.
[80] The defendants McKenzie, Barker, Gearheart [sic] and
Costas Georgiou, known as Callan, to the death penalty.
[81] Under the terms of the Service Order of 12th September
the case documents, with all the evidence, including the audiovisual
record of the trial, will be submitted through the Ministry of Justice
to Comrade President of the People's Movement for the Liberation of
Angola and the People's Republic of Angola, so that he may confirm
or otherwise the death penalties imposed.
The proceedings of the Tribunal are closed.
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APPENDIX III
LAW NO. 7/76 OF 1ST OF MAY
With the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola, fruit
of centuries of resistance by the Angolan People and of their heroic
struggle, under the leadership of MPLA, against foreign domination and
oppression, with the achievement of victory in the liberation of the
country against the aggression by the forces of international imperialism
and its internal agents, it becomes imperative that the Revolution creates
and puts into effect the necessary means for its own defence. It is the
right and the sacred duty of the Revolution to defend itself strongly
and surely against its enemies, both internal and external.
With the institution of the Directorate of Information and Security
of Angola, by Decree No. 3/75, of 29th of November, there is now
needed the creation of a Tribunal which, with a permanent character,
will proceed with the judgment of criminal and counter-revolutionary
acts by enemies of the Revolution.
This is the purpose of the present law which, by virtue of article
44 of the Constitutional Law, institutes the People's Revolutionary
Court, establishing at the same time the procedural norms which will
govern its functioning and work.
In deciding the procedural methods, there was concern to link har-
moniously the interests of simplicity and speed of process, avoiding
excessive or delaying formalities, with the interests of dignity and gravity
of justice, permitting to the accused full guaranties of defence in con-
formity with the constitutional ruling which so demands.
The People's Revolutionary Court, dealing justice severe but mea-
sured, to the enemies of the Revolution, will act with all the legitimacy
which accrues to it as the product of the supreme instance of State in
the People's Republic of Angola and of the vanguard of the Angolan
People, the MPLA.
Guided by uncompromising defence of the interests of the Angolan
People and, particularly, of its most exploited classes, the People's
Revolutionary Court will effectively watch over the maintenance and
continuation of the revolutionary process in train, with the object of
the installation of People's Power and of the creation of a just society
and a new personality, as the supreme target and reason for being of
our struggle.
In this tenor by virtue of sub-paragraph a) of article 38 of the Con-
stitutional Law and by right of the power given in sub-paragraph e) of
article 32 of the same Law, the Council of the Revolution decrees and
I promulgate the following:
THE LAW CONSTITUTING THE PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY COURT
Article I
(Constitution, Jurisdiction and Seat)
1. The People's Revolutionary Court is constituted, with its seat
in the capital of the People's Republic of Angola and with jurisdiction
over the whole national territory.
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2. The People's Revolutionary Court can act in any part of the
national territory, if this is thought to be more convenient for the proper
administration of justice.
Article 2
The People's Revolutionary Court is governed by the dispositions
of the present document and by the legal regulations that will be pub-
lished by the government.
Article 3
(Competence)
1. The People's Revolutionary Court is competent to bring to judg-
ment crimes carried out against the Angolan people and their unity,
against the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola and its ter-
ritorial integrity, of acts and activities which threaten the principles
and fundamental rights stipulated in the Constitutional Law, of those who
threaten the organs the State or the MPLA or their titulars, as well as
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
2. The People's Revolutionary Court is further competent to try
any other crimes if due to their nature, perpetrator or public repercussions,
the Court itself should so decide.
Article 4
(Composition)
The People's Revolutionary Court is composed of five judges -
a presiding judge and four others named by dispatch by the President
of the Republic, after consultation with the Council of the Revolution.
Two of the judges should be graduates in Law.,
2. The judges are appointed on a service commission for six months,
and may combine this [with] other functions.
3. If there is a legal objection to any of the judges, the President
of the Republic shall make a substitution after consultation with the
Council of the Revolution.
Article 5
(The People's Prosecutor)
1. A People's Prosecutor acts in conjunction with the Court and
represents the People's Republic of Angola and the Angolan people.
He has the duty of presenting the indictment.
2. The People's Prosecutor is named in the same way as described
in points 1 and 2 of the previous article.
3. In the exercise of his functions, he may use counsellors if he
considers this to be appropriate.
Article 6
(Official Defence)
The Court will organise a list of official defence counsel chosen by
the presiding judge, who will be called to prepare the defence only in
cases where no defence lawyer has been indicated by the defendant.
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Article 7
(Secretary)
1. A Secretary will work with the Court, and will be responsible
for preparing the reports and documents of the case, as well as the
whole report concerning the Court, the People's Prosecutor and the
official defence.
2. The government will organise a team of persons as necessary to
enable the secretary to function as required.
Article 8
(Preparation of the case)
The preparation of the case is secret and will be carried out by
the authorities to whom the law attributes this competence.
Article 9
(Presentation of the case)
1. After the preparation of the case, it is presented to the People's
Prosecutor who, if he finds that it shows sufficient evidence of a punish-
able offence, the identity of the offenders and their responsibility, formu-
lates the charge in the terms of the following article and sends the case
to the Court.
2. If the People's Prosecutor considers that the case does not show
sufficient evidence as mentioned in the point above, no charge is made.
He shall state in the report the justifying reasons of fact and law, and
shall send the case to the Court.
3. The Court, if it considers the reasons invoked to be pertinent,
will order the case to be definitively filed. If it does not, it will return
the case to the People's Prosecutor, recommending him to proceed with
the charges. The People's Prosecutor will follow this recommendation,
or not, as he believes to be right. If not to be followed, he himself
will order the case to be definitively filed.
4. If, however, the People's Prosecutor considers that further
investigation is necessary to reveal the truth, he will so state in the
reports; and send them to the authorities preparing the case.
Article 10
(Charges)
The charges are set out point by point, and should specify:
a) The name and all the facts which help to determine the identity
of the defendant;
b) A summary of the punishable fact or facts, with an indication of
the time and place where they were committed and all the circumstances
that can help to define them or help towards an understanding of the
culpability of the defendant;
c) Indication of the laws and rules infringed;




e) List of witnesses with which it is intended to prove the charge,
and indication of other proofs.
Article 11
(Decision of the court)
When the case is received by the Court, it will proceed to examine
it and afterwards will make a dispatch in one of the following ways:
a) The decision that the case should be the object of a trial, if it is
found that there is sufficient substantive evidence to show the criminal
responsibility of the defendant;
b) The decision to file the case if it is considered that such sub-
stantive evidence does not exist;
c) The decision that the case should be returned to the authorities
who prepared it, if it is considered that further investigation is necessary
to reveal the truth.
Article 12
(Notice of charges)
If the decision were to be that of point (a) of the previous article
the judge will issue a notice of charges, the duplicate of which will be
given to the defendant and which must necessarily contain:
a) The content of the charges;
b) The name of an official defence counsel, with the indication that
the defendant may call upon the defence counsel of his choice up to
the day of the trial;
c) Indication that the case can be seen in the Court office during a
period of eight days, and may be freely consulted by the defence
counsel;
d) Indication that during this period of eight days the defence coun-
sel can present his case for the defence, in writing; mentioning all the
previous questions raised, indicating the defence witnesses and other
proofs to be produced at the trial.
Article 13
(Constituting of the Defence Counsel)
1. In order to constitute the defence, official documents are not
necessary; the simple naming of such by the defendant in writing or
verbally, and the corresponding acceptance by the defence counsel is
sufficient.
2. As soon as defence counsel is chosen by the defendant, the
intervention of the official defence counsel previously named ceases.
Article 14
(Receipt of the Defence and Setting of the trial date)
1. After the period of eight days, the Court will examine the De-
fence requirements, resolving all the questions raised and setting a date
for the trial.
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2. The People's Prosecutor, the defendants and defence counsel
are notified of the dispatch fixing the trial date at least 48 hours before
the set date.
3. Only the witnesses living in the Court seat area will be notified,
the others must be presented at the hearing by the party that has
enlisted them.
Article 15
(Public nature of the trial)
1. The trial is public.
2. The presiding judge is responsible for maintaining the order and




The Court shall be considered to be in session when all the judges,
the People's Prosecutor and the defendant are present, apart from the
latter, in the case of a person being tried in absentia.
Article 17
(Duties of defence counsel)
If during the hearing the defence counsel do not hold the Court in
due respect, or by clear abuse try to delay or obstruct the normal
procedure of the work, use injurious, violent or aggressive language
against the public authorities or any other persons, or make explana-
tions or comments on matters extraneous to the trial and that could not
serve to clarify it, they will be warned by the presiding judge. If,
after warnings, this behaviour is repeated, the presiding judge can
withdraw their right to speak, entrusting the defence to another counsel
chosen by him, without prejudice to criminal and disciplinary proceed-
ings if these should take place against the counsel.
Article 18
(Lack of respect by the defendant)
If the defendant shows lack of respect for the Court, he will be
warned and if he continues, he will be ordered to be taken under guard
to some Court waiting room or to the prison, which he will only leave
to hear the sentence.
Article 19
1. The trial is oral, with the exception of the sentence which is
written. All the things which happen during the hearing shall be
formulated into a concise court record by one of the secretariat officials,
but in this the statements are not included.
2. The presiding judge may, however, decide to make a tape re-
cording of all or some of the statements.
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3. The formalities will be the most simple and adequate that reveal
the truth, without prejudice to the guarantee of defence allowed to the
defendant.
Article 20
(Reading of the charges and the defence)
When the hearing opens, and the defendant or defendants have been
brought into the court room the presiding judge will order one of the
Court secretariat officials to read the charges and the written defence,
which the defendant should have presented.
-Article 21
(Identification of the defendant)
The presiding judge will follow by identifying the defendant, asking
him for his name, marital status, parentage, profession, nationality,
residence, whether or not he has ever been found guilty or detained
in prison, and will advise the defendant that he is not obliged to answer
questions that are asked of him about the facts of which he is accused.
Article 22
(Examination of the defendant)
1. The examination of the defendant about the facts of which he is
accused is done by any of the judges.
2. This is followed by complementary questions to the defendant by
the prosecution and defence.
3. If there are co-defendants in the same case, the examination of
each one will be made separately, at the end of which they will be
confronted with each other if this is necessary in order to reveal the
truth.
4. The questions shall not be leading, or deceitful, or accompanied
by fraudulent persuasion, false promises or threats.
5. If the defendant pleads guilty, he will be particularly questioned
on his motives, and on the time, place, manner and methods used in
commiting it.
6. If the defendant denies facts that are already in his statement,
or in other statements or documents which have been introduced into
the court, the presiding judge can read him the relevant extracts and
press him on those facts.
Article 23
(Presentation of evidence)
1. The presentation of evidence by prosecution and defence fol-
lows, through the investigation of statements, calling of witnesses, tech-
nical evidence, inspections and the exhibition of documents.
2. The witnesses and the experts can be questioned by any of the
judges, with the prosecution and defence able to put any complementary
questions necessary for improved clarification of the truth.
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Article 24
(Closing speeches)
1. This is followed by the closing speeches, given first by the
People's Prbsecutor and then by the defence. Replies are not per-
mitted.
Article 25
(Closing of the hearing)
1. At the end of the closing speeches the presiding judge will
ask the defendant if he has anything further to add in his defence,
hearing everything that he has to say towards it.
2. Following this the presiding judge will declare the hearing
closed, and the Court will retire to decide on the matters of facts and of
law and formulate a sentence.
Article 26
(Sentence)
1. The sentence is given in the name of the People's Republic of
Angola and of the Angolan People and shall be written and be personally
signed by each judge. The votes of dissenters, if there should be any,
will appear only in a secret record.
2. The sentence is publicly read by the Presiding Judge, the pres-




1. There is no appeal against the decisions of the court, whether
final or interim.
2. The only kind of appeal permitted is to the Court, itself, against
failings, ambiguity or lack of clarity in the sentence or dispatches. The
court will immediately and definitively decide on it.
Article 28
(Trial in absentia)
An absent defendant will be tried in absentia and the presiding judge
will designate an official defence counsel for him.
Article 29
(Validity)
This law comes into force immediately.
Read and approved by the Council of the Revolution
Promulgated on 1st May 1976
Publish it.




"TEXTS FOR THE ANGOLAN COMBATANT"
LAW OF DISCIPLINE
CHAPTER III - REWARDS, DECORATIONS, PENALTIES
1-Rewards and penalties are intended not only to reinforce the means
which discipline and education give to those with responsibility in the
direction of their subordinates, but also to give effect to equitable jus-
tice.
Rewards encourage zeal, dedication, punctuality and respect.
Penalties regulate conduct, combat and prevent lapses in duty and
law.
I-REWARDS
2-Rewards are of the following kinds:
a) Citations in service orders for acts of courage and self-denial.
b) Oral congratulations, attesting to satisfaction for behaviour or dis-
ciplinary spirit.
c) Leave permission of every kind: consessionary, family visits, per-
sonal affairs and others to be established by service order.























Detachment commander and in





Regional command on the
recommendation of the respective
Disciplinary Council




4-Any combatant can be awarded a decoration by the Executive for
acts of bravery, exemplary spirit, length of service in the ranks, etc. The
relevant Disciplinary Councils must be consulted in the award of decora-
tions.
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III - PENALTIES
A - Offences
5-Offences are classified in the following way:
a) Offence with regard to laws, authorities and people.
b) Public demonstration, in any way, of opinions which would pre-
judice discipline or which are contrary to the statutory principles and pro-
gram of MPLA.
c) Lying or concealment of offences.
d) Disclosure of secret or confidential information.
e) Breaches of military regulations or of instructions in service orders.
f) Indolence, idleness, ill-will, negligence in duty.
g) Offences against the dignity of the struggle and of the units, drunk-
enness, brawling, rowdiness, ill-advised practical jokes, intrigue, embez-
zlement of funds and equipment etc.
h) Failure to observe police regulations of the entity or countries
which give us hospitality.
i) Taking on duties which are not authorized by superiors.
B - RIGHT OF PUNISHMENT AND
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT
6-Every combatant, whether in authority or not, has the duty of con-
tributing to the maintenance of discipline, by pointing out his own of-
fences or the offences of others. The authorities must give prompt pun-
ishment to their subordinates.
7-Any punishment given or sought requires the presentation of evi-
dence and proof.
8-The accused must be heard before the punishment is carried out.
C - DECISION ON PENALTIES
9-The authorities must act so as to prevent offences. When they
are obliged to use penalities, they should be guided by the following con-
siderations:
a) Justice and impartiality. Penalties are not an exercise of per-
sonal authority. The authorities are merely agents to carry out the regu-
lations. The penalty is proportional to the gravity of the offence and to
the circumstances in which it was committed. The person responsible
must take into account the background of the combatant to be punished,
his usual behaviour, his character and his length of service in the ranks.
The first penalty must be carefully studied owing to the importance it
carries in the eyes of the combatant.
b) Certain circumstances are of a kind to aggravate the offence, for
example: if there is repetition, if it is carried out openly, if it is collective.




d) Any penalties can be suspended or cancelled by higher instance to
those which determined them.
D - CATEGORY OF PENALTIES
10-The various kinds of penalties are as follows:
a) Oral warning.
b) Simple, oral rebuke.
c) Rebuke on parade. This is written and recorded on individual
records and involves confinement to quarters.
d) Simple imprisonment. This is recorded and can involve loss of
rank. Involves later confinement to quarters.
e) Severe imprisonment. This is recorded and involves later deten-
tion and loss of rank.
f) Suspension of right to fight. Recorded.
g) Expulsion. Recorded. On the decision of the Directorate on
recommendation from the Disciplinary Council.






























Zone Commander upwards on
recommendation of the relevant
Disciplinary Council
Zone Commander upwards on
recommendation of the relevant
Disciplinary Council
Everyone Military Commission on
recommendation of the relevant
Disciplinary Council
Everyone Directing Committee on
recommendation of the relevant
Disciplinary Council
Everyone and Directing Committee
enemies (special regulations)
IV - DISCIPLINARY COUNCILS
11-The Disciplinary Councils are consultative organs in the award-
ing of penalities and rewards.
12-The Zonal and Regional Councils must be constituted thus:
a) If the offender is a combatant - by the Commander, the Politi-
cal Commissar and a combatant.
b) If the offender is a civilian - by the Commander, the Political
Commissar and by a civilian.
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c) In any of these cases the setting up of a defence is always al-
lowed.
MATSENDE, 10th July 1966
The Military Commission
(Approved in the Executive Meeting)
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION
OF ANGOLA SERVICE ORDER
Considering the disposition in sub-paragraph h, paragraph No. 10 of
Section D of Chapter III of the LAW OF DISCIPLINE FOR THE
COMBATANT, and confirming the need to make application of the
death penalty conditional on prior higher consideration,
I RULE:
In future, no death penalty by firing squad can be carried out unless










The People's Republic of Angola shall be a sovereign, independent
and democratic State whose prime objective shall be the Angolan peo-
ple's total liberation from the vestiges of colonialism and the domination
and aggression of imperialism, and building a prosperous and democratic
country entirely free from any form of exploitation of man by man,
thereby fulfilling the aspirations of the masses.
ARTICLE 2
All sovereignty shall be vested in the Angolan people. The MPLA,
their legitimate representative, constituted by a broad front which in-
cludes all patriotic forces engaged in the anti-imperialist struggle, shall
be responsible for the political, economic and social leadership of the na-
tion.
ARTICLE 3
The masses shall be guaranteed broad effective participation in the
exercise of political power, through the consolidation, expansion and




The People's Republic of Angola shall be a unitary and indivisible
State whose inviolable and inalienable territory shall be that defined
by the present geographical limits of Angola, and any attempt at separa-
tism or the dismembering of its territory shall be vigorously combated.
ARTICLE 5
Economic, social and cultural solidarity shall be promoted and in-
tensified between all regions of the People's Republic of Angola, for
the common development of the entire Angolan nation and the elimina-
tion of remnants of regionalism and tribalism.
ARTICLE 6
Under the leadership of MPLA and with its President as Comman-
der-in-Chief, the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
(FAPLA), the armed wing of the people, shall be institutionalised as
the national army of the People's Republic of Angola. It shall be the
responsibility of FAPLA to defend the country's territorial integrity and
to participate alongside the people in production, and hence in national
reconstruction.
The Commander-in-Chief of the People's Armed Forces for the Lib-
eration of Angola (FAPLA) shall appoint and dismiss high-raiiking
military officials.
ARTICLE 7
The People's Republic of Angola shall be a secular State, and there
shall be complete separation of the State and religious institutions. All
religions shall be respected, and the State shall afford churches and
places and objects of worship protection so long as they comply with the
State laws.
ARTICLE 8
The People's Republic of Angola shall regard agriculture as the base
and industry as the decisive factor in its development. The State shall
orientate and plan the national economy with a view to the systematic
and harmonious development of all the country's natural and human re-
sources and the use of wealth for the benefit of the Angolan people.
ARTICLE 9
The People's Republic of Angola shall promote the establishment of
just social relations in all sectors of production, furthering and devel-
oping the public sector and fostering cooperative forms. One of the very
special tasks of the People's Republic of Angola shall be to solve the
land problem in the interests of the peasant masses.
ARTICLE 10
The People's Republic of Angola shall recognise, protect and guaran-
tee private activities and property, even those of foreigners, so long as
they are useful to the country's economy and to the interests of the An-
golan people.
ARTICLE 11
All natural resources in the soil and subsoil, in the territorial waters,
on the continental self and in the air space shall be the property of the
State, which shall determine how they shall be used.
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ARTICLE 12
The fiscal system shall be guided by the principle of graduated di-
rect taxation, and no privileges of any kind shall be permitted in fiscal
matters.
ARTICLE 13
The People's Republic of Angola shall vigorously combat illiteracy
and obscurantism, and promote the development of education at the ser-
vice of the people, and of a true national culture, enriched by the revolu-
tionary cultural gains of other peoples.
ARTICLE 14
The People's Republic of Angola shall respect and apply the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity. It shall establish relations of friendship
and cooperation with all States, based on the principles of mutual re-
spect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality, non-interference
in the internal affairs of each country, and reciprocal benefits.
ARTICLE 15
The People's Republic of Angola supports and is in solidarity with
the struggle of the peoples for national liberation, and it shall establish
relations of friendship and cooperation with all democratic and progres-
sive forces in the world.
ARTICLE 16
The People's Republic of Angola shall not join any international
military organisation, nor shall it allow the installation of foreign mili-
tary bases on its national territory.
PART II
Fundamental Rights and Duties
ARTICLE 17
The State shall respect and protect the human person and human
dignity. Every citizen shall have the right to the free development of
personality while maintaining the respect due to the rights of other citi-
zens and to the higher interests of the Angolan people. The life, liberty,
personal integrity, good name and repute of every citizen shall be pro-
tected by law.
ARTICLE 18
All citizens shall be equal before the law and enjoy the same rights.
They shall be subject to the same duties, without any distinction based on
colour, race, ethnic group, sex, place of birth, religion, level of educa-
tion, or economic or social status.
Any acts designed to jeopardize social harmony or create discrimina-
tion or privileges based on such factors shall be severely punished un-
der the law.
ARTICLE 19
It shall be the right of the highest and indeclinable duty of every
citizen of the People's Republic of Angola to participate in the defence
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of the country's territorial integrity and to defend and extend the revolu-
tionary gains.
ARTICLE 20
All citizens aged over eighteen, other than those legally deprived of
political rights, shall have the right and the duty to take an active part in
public life, to vote and be elected or appointed to any State organ, and
to discharge their mandate with full dedication to the cause of the coun-
try and the Angolan people.
ARTICLE 21
It shall be the duty of every elected citizen to account for the dis-
charge of his mandate to the electors who have chosen him, who shall at
any time have the right entirely to revoke the mandate granted.
ARTICLE 22
In the context of the achievement of the basic objectives of the Peo-
ple's Republic of Angola, the law shall ensure freedom of expression,
assembly and association.
ARTICLE 23
No citizen shall be arrested and brought to trial except under the
terms of the law, and all accused shall be guaranteed the right of de-
fence.
ARTICLE 24
The People's Republic of Angola shall guarantee individual freedoms,
namely the inviolability of the home and the privacy of correspondence,
subject to the limits especially provided by the law.
ARTICLE 25
Freedom of conscience and belief shall be inviolable. The Peo-
ple's Republic of Angola shall recognise the equality and guarantee the
practice of all forms of worship compatible with public order and the na-
tional interest.
ARTICLE 26
Work shall be the right and duty of all citizens, each of whom must
produce according to his ability and be remunerated according to his work.
ARTICLE 27
The State shall promote the requisite measures to ensure the right
of citizens to medical and health care, and also the right to assistance in
childhood, motherhood, disability, old age and any other form of inca-
pacity for work.
ARTICLE 28
Fighters in the national liberation war who have been disabled and
the families of fighters who died in the struggle shall, as a debt of honour of
the People's Republic of Angola, have the right to special protection.
ARTICLE 29
The People's Republic of Angola shall promote and guarantee the
access of all citizens to education and culture.
ARTICLE 30
The People's Republic of Angola must create political, economic and
cultural conditions which effectively enable citizens to enjoy their rights
and discharge their duties in full.
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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
ARTICLE 31
The President of the People's Republic of Angola shall be the Presi-
dent of the MPLA.
As Head of State, the President of the Republic shall represent
the Angolan nation.
ARTICLE 32
The President of the Republic shall have the following specific func-
tions:
(a) to preside over the Council of the Revolution and direct its pro-
ceedings;
(b) to swear in the Government appointed by the Council of the Rev-
olution;
(c) to declare war and make peace, following authorisation by the
Council of the Revolution;
(d) to swear in the provincial commissioners appointed by the Coun-
cil of the Revolution on the recommendation of the MPLA;
(e) to sign, promulgate, and publish the laws of the Council of the
Revolution, Government decrees and statutory Ministerial de-
crees;
(j) to direct national defence;
(g) to pardon and commute sentences;
(h) to indicate, from among the members of the Council of the Rev-
olution, the person who shall replace him in his absence or when
temporarily prevented from exercising his functions;
(i) to discharge all other functions conferred on him by the Council
of the Revolution.
ARTICLE 33
In case of the death, renunciation or permanent incapacity of the
President of the Republic, the Council of the Revolution shall appoint
from among its members the person who shall provisionally exercise the




The People's Assembly shall be the supreme State body in the Peo-
ple's Republic of Angola.
A special law shall establish its composition and its system of election,




COUNCIL OF THE REVOLUTION
ARTICLE 35
Pending the total liberation of the national territory and fulfilment
of the conditions for the institution of the People's Assembly, the Coun-
cil of the Revolution shall be the supreme organ of State power.
ARTICLE 36
The Council of the Revolution shall comprise:
(a) the members of the MPLA Political Bureau;
(b) the members of the FAPLA General Staff;
(c) the Government members appointed by the MPLA to this ef-
fect;
(d) the Provincial Commissioners;
(e) the Chiefs of Staff and Political Commissars of the Military
Fronts.
ARTICLE 37
The Council of the Revolution shall be presided over by the President
of the Republic.
ARTICLE 38
The Council of the Revolution shall exercise the following duties:
(a) to discharge legislative functions, which it may delegate to the
Government;
(b) to define and conduct the country's domestic and foreign policy;
(c) to approve the General State Budget and the Economic Plan
drawn up by the Government;
(d) to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and other members of
the Government, on the recommendation of the MPLA;
(e) to appoint and dismiss Provincial Commissioners, on the recom-
mendation of the MPLA;(J) to authorise the President of the Republic to declare war and
make peace;
(g) to decree a state of siege or a state of emergency;




The Government shall be constituted by the Prime Minister, the
Ministers and the Secretaries of State.
The Government shall be presided over by the Prime Minister.
ARTICLE 40
It shall be incumbent on the Government, as the executive organ,
to conduct the State's domestic and foreign policy, under the leadership
of the Council of the Revolution and of the President of the Republic,
and to supervise public administration as a whole.
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ARTICLE 41
The Government's functions shall be especially:
(a) to guarantee the safety of persons and property;
(b) to draw up the general State budget and to implement it once it is
approved by the Council of the Revolution;
(c) to draw up the Economic Plan and to implement it once it is
approved by the Council of the Revolution.
ARTICLE 42
The Government may exercise by decree the legislative functions
delegated to it by the Council of the Revolution. The implementation
of the laws passed by the Council of the Revolution and of Government
decrees shall be incumbent on the Ministers.
ARTICLE 43
.The Government may meet with the Council of the Revolution, in




The discharge of judicial functions shall be exclusively vested in the
Courts with a view to the fulfilment of democratic justice.
The organisation, composition and competence of the Courts shall be
established by law.
ARTICLE 45





The People's Republic of Angola shall be administratively divided
into Provincias (Provinces), Concelhos (Councils), Comunas (Communes),
Circulos (Circles), Bairros (Neighbourhoods) and Povoaces (Villages).
ARTICLE 47
The local administration shall be guided by the combined principles
of unity, decentralisation and local initiative.
ARTICLE 48
In a Province, the Provincial Commissioner shall be the direct repre-
sentative of the Council of the Revolution and of the Government.
The Government shall be represented on the Council by the Local
Commissioner, in the Commune by the Commune Commissioner and
in the Circle by the Delegate, who shall be appointed on the recommen-




Each Province shall have a Provincial Commission, which shall be
presided over by the Provincial Commissioner and shall exercise legisla-
tive functions in matters of exclusive concern to the Province.
ARTICLE 50
The Administrative Bodies of the Council, Commune, Neighbour-
hood and Village shall be, respectively, the Town Hall, the Commune
Commission, and the People's Neighbourhood or Village Commission.
ARTICLE 51
The local authorities shall have legal personality and shall enjoy ad-
ministrative and financial autonomy.
ARTICLE 52
The structure and jurisdiction of Administrative Bodies and other
organs of local administration shall be established by law.
PART IV
Symbols of the People's Republic of Angola
ARTICLE 53
The symbols of the People's Republic of Angola shall be the FLAG,
the INSIGNIA and the NATIONAL ANTHEM.
ARTICLE 54
The NATIONAL FLAG shall consist of two colours in horizontal
bands. The upper band shall be bright red and lower band black.
Bright red shall represent the blood shed by Angolans under colonial
oppression, the national liberation struggle, and the revolution.
Black shall represent the African Continent.
In the centre a composition shall be formed of a segment of a cog-
wheel symbolising the working class and industrial production; a ma-
chete symbolising the peasant class, agricultural production and the
armed struggle; and a star symbolising internationalism and progress.
The cog-wheel, the machete and the star shall be yellow, represent-
ing the country's wealth.
ARTICLE 55
The insignia of the People's Republic of Angola shall be composed
of a segment of a cog-wheel and sheafs of maize, coffee and cotton,
representing respectively, the working class and industrial production,
and the peasant class and agricultural production.
At the foot of the design, an open book shall symbolise education
and culture and the rising sun representing the new country. In the
centre a machete and a hoe shall symbolise work and the beginning of
the armed struggle. At the top, a star shall symbolise internationalism
and progress.
In the lower part of the emblem, a golden band shall bear the in-
scription of ((People's Republic of Angola}
ARTICLE 56
The National Anthem shall be <(ANGOLA AVANTI
(( Forward Angola }) )
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PART V
Final and Transitional Provisions
ARTICLE 57
Pending the establishment of the Assembly with constitutional pow-
ers, an amendment to the present Constitution may be made only by the
MPLA Central Committee.
ARTICLE 58
The laws and regulations at present in force shall be applicable un-
less repealed or amended and only so long as they do not conflict with
the spirit of the present law or the Angolan revolutionary process.
ARTICLE 59
All treaties, agreements and alliances to which Portugal has com-
mitted Angola which are contrary to the interests of the Angolan people
shall be reviewed.
ARTICLE 60
The present document shall enter into force at zero/zero hours on
11 November 1975.
Approved by acclamation by the Central Committee
of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola,
on 10 November 1975.
Ant6nio Agostinho Neto, President of the MPLA.
APPENDIX VI
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
ON MERCENARIES
DECLARATION ON THE COMPLIANCE OF ANGOLAN PROCEDURAL LAW
WITH THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES GUARANTEEING RESPECT FOR
THE RIGHT TO DEFENCE
I. The effective consecration of respect for the rights of defence de-
mands, according to principles common to different juridical systems,
the observance of the following rules:
a) the defendant, has a right to know the charges that are being
made against him;
b) the defendant has a right to examine the case file;
c) the defendant has a right to question the witnesses for the prose-
cution;
d) the defendant has a right to be heard;
e) the defendant has a right to present his own witnesses;
0 the defendant has a right to be assisted by counsel;
g) the trial must be public.
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II. An analysis by the International Commission of Enquiry of Law
[No.] 7/76 of 1st [of] May, which creates the People's Revolutionary
Court and lays down the procedural norms which govern the court,
shows that the above mentioned principles referring to the right of
defence have been fully respected. In fact:
a) sub-paragraph (a) of Article 12 in conjunction with Article 10 of
the Angolan law stipulates that the defendant is obligatorily notified
of the charges against him, namely, a' brief statement of the punishable
acts, an indication of the laws and rules which were violated and the
demand for application of the corresponding penalties.
b) sub-paragraph (c) of Article 12 consecrates the right of the de-
fendant, through his counsel, to have access and freely consult the case
file during an eight day period.
c) No. 2 of Article 23 of the Angolan law provides for the right of
the defendant to question the witnesses for the prosecution.
d) The right of the defendant to be heard is guaranteed by Articles
20, 22 nos. 1 and 2, 24 and 25 no. 1, all from the above-mentioned Law
[No.] 7/76.
e) Article 12 sub-paragraph (d) and Article 23 no. 1 stipulate that
the defendant may present his own witnesses and that these shall be
heard.
f) The right to be assisted by counsel is effectively guaranteed by
Article 12, sub-paragraph (b) and by Article 13, not only by the right
which the defendant has of naming a defence counsel of his own choice
up to the day of the trial, but also by the obligation of the Court to name
an official defence counsel in the notice of charges.
g) Finally, Article 15 no. 1 prescribes that the trial is public.
III. The principle "nullum crimen sine lege" according to which no
fact is considered a crime and therefore punishable without a pre-
existing law declaring it as such, is a principle which is recognized by
the different juridical systems and is consecrated in the Constitutional
Law of the People's Republic of Angola and reaffirmed in Law [No.]
7/76 of 1st [of] May, which creates the People's Revolutionary Court.
It is respected by the indictment presented in the present case as it is
based on internal law and on the norms and principles of international
law that the People's Republic of Angola, as a sovereign State, decided
to make its own.
LUANDA, 12 June 1976
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
ON MERCENARIES
FINAL STATEMENT AND VERIFICATION OF THE FAIRNESS OF
THE PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL IN ACCORD WITH THE
CRITERIA PREVIOUSLY LAID DOWN
Having attended and observed all sessions of the trial of the mer-
cenaries before the People's Revolutionary Court, the International Com-
mission of Enquiry on Mercenaries is satisfied that the trial has been
fair and conducted with dignity and solemnity.
1977]
CASE W. RES. j. INT'L L.
The Commission is further convinced that all rules of procedure have
been interpreted in favour of or extended in favour of observing the rights
of the defendants.
LUANDA, 19 June, 1976
APPENDIX VII
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
ON MERCENARIES
DECLARATION OF LUANDA, 10TH JUNE, 1976
I. For twenty years now, there have been armed interventions by
mercenaries against the sovereignty of new states or against liberation
movements. The mass media exposed at the time the massacre at
Stanleyville, the armed interventions in Cuba, Southern Sudan, Nigeria
during the civil war, in Guinea, Palestine, etc. Thus several African
leaders were assassinated.
II. In the most recent period, the independence of Angola and the
proclamation of the People's Republic have been quickly followed by
military intervention by the Republic of South Africa and the Republic
of Zaire. Besides these interventions by regular armies, groups of mer-
cenaries likewise invaded Angolan territory, where they engaged in armed
actions of various kinds (attacks on detachments of the national Angolan
army, ambushes, planting of mines, destruction of bridges and buildings),
in the summary execution of prisoners and in the massacres of civilians.
III. The mercenaries who invaded Angola had been recruited in
the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Portu-
gal. Some of them were contacted by way of advertisements in the
press and television broadcasts. Not only do various documents es-
tablish the existence of private recruiting agencies in the United States
and Great Britain, but there are also periodicals like Soldier of Fortune,
from Colorado, which campaign for the recruitment of mercenaries.
It is clear that the recruitment, travel and equipment of mercenaries
could not be accomplished without the tacit agreement of the govern-
ments in the countries where they are recruited and equipped. More
particularly, inasmuch as the intervention of the mercenaries is directed
against the liberation of peoples from colonial and neo-colonial domina-
tion, there can be no doubt that they act in the service of those who
would like to suppress or prevent their liberation. This is all the more
obvious since many of the countries concerned, in particular the United
States of America, have legislation against mercenarism which is not
applied.
IV. In fact, international organizations have condemned these activi-
ties on several occasions: Resolutions 2395 (XXIII), 2465 (XXIII),
2548 (XXIV) and 3103 (XXVII) of the United Nations General As-
sembly; Statements of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU,
Kinshasa 1967 and Addis Ababa 1971; but these condemnations of
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mercenarism, which we applaud, have had no practical effect and public
opinion has not yet forced the relevant States to give them considera-
tion. Unfortunately, the too frequent glorification of mercenary activity
by the mass media has not made it any easier to mobilise the great force
which international public opinion represents.
Moreover, despite the victory won by the People's Republic of Angola
in its just fight against foreign intervention, there are reasons for think-
ing that new actions of a similar kind are now being prepared in Southern
Africa and other parts of the world. The concentration of mercenaries
has been discovered in Namibia and in Zimbabwe, under the aegis of
the minority racist regimes now in power in these countries. Puerto
Rico is similarly used as a base for mercenary aggression in Latin
America.
Finally, new forms of mercenarism are continually being created in
response to new needs to repress workers' struggles or movements for
national independence throughout the world. Multinational corpora-
tions and espionage agencies make more and more use of them.
In all these aspects, mercenarism is revealed as the instrument of
those who attempt to maintain, establish or restore fascism, colonialism,
neo-colonialism and racism and, more generally, of imperialism's counter-
offensive against the progress of liberty and peace in the world.
V. The members of the International Commission of Enquiry on
Mercenaries, called together at the initiative of the Government of the
People's Republic of Angola, coming from all the continents and repre-
senting forty-two countries, at a plenary session held in Luanda on 10th
June 1976, have decided to draw the attention of international public
opinion to the seriousness of the menace which the armed intervention
of mercenaries presents to peace in Africa and the whole world. It is
urgent to act now to prevent the recruitment and travel of mercenaries
to Namibia and Zimbabwe.
The imperialist powers are wholly responsible for the destruction
and the crimes done in the past and which can be repeated in the future
on African soil. Public opinion can and must put an end to military
intervention by intermediaries. The drafting of an International Con-
vention prohibiting recruitment, travel and arming of mercenaries, and
all kinds of support whatsoever for their activities, should be strongly
demanded of all countries.
We appeal to all governments to adhere to the international principles
set out in United Nations resolutions and declarations of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity, to sign the International Convention, to ensure
that their own national legislation accords with it, and to enforce its
provisions effectively.
The members of the Commission hope that a, White Book will be
published on the activities of mercenaries in Africa and in all the world.
They ask those who are able to provide information on this subject to
send it to the Minister of Justice of the People's Republic of Angola.
They appeal to all progressive people and forces in the world to make
every effort to destroy this scourge of humanity which is mercenarism.
LUANDA, 10 June 1976
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APPENDIX VIII
DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION
OF MERCENARISM
PREAMBLE
The High Contracting Parties
Seriously concerned at the use of mercenaries in armed conflicts with
the aim of opposing by armed force the process of national liberation
from racist colonial and neo-colonial domination;
Considering that the crime of mercenarism is part of a process of
perpetuating by force of arms racist colonial or neo-colonial domination
over a people or a State;
Considering the resolutions of the United Nations (Res. 2395 (XXIII),
2465 (XXIII), 2548 (XXIV) and 3103 (XXVIII) of the General Assembly)
and of the Organization of African Unity (ECM/Res. 5 (III), 1964;
AHG/Res. 49 (IV), 1967; ECM/Res. 17 (VII), 1970; and OAU Declara-
tion on the Activities of Mercenaries in Africa - CM/St. 6 (XVII)),
which have denounced the use in these armed conflicts of mercenaries as
a criminal act, and mercenaries as criminals, and which have urged States
to take forceful measures to prevent the organization, recruitment and
movement on their territory of mercenaries, and to bring to justice the
authors of this crime and their accomplices;
Considering that the resolutions of the UN and the OAU and the
statements of attitude and the practice of a growing number of States
are indicative of the development of new rules of international law mak-
ing mercenarism an international crime;
Convinced of the need to codify in a single text and to develop pro-
gressively the rules of international law which have developed in order
to prevent and suppress mercenarism, the High Contracting Parties are
convinced of the following matters:
Article One
(Definition)
The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or
association, representatives of state and the State itself which, with the
aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination,
practices any of the following acts:
a) organizes, finances, supplies, equips, trains, promotes, supports or
employs in any way military forces consisting of or including persons
who are not nationals of the country where they are going to act, for
personal gain, through the payment of a salary or any other kind of
material recompense;
b) enlists, enrols [sic] or tries to enrol in the said forces;
c) allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried
out in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its con-





The fact of assuming command over mercenaries or giving orders
may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Article Three
1. When the representative of a State is responsible by virtue of
the foregoing provisions for acts or omissions declared by the foregoing
provisions to be criminal, he shall be punished for such an act or omis-
sion.
2. When a State is responsible by virtue of the foregoing provisions
for acts or omissions declared by the foregoing provisions to be criminal,
any other State may invoke such responsibility:
(a) in its relations with the State responsible, and
(b) before competent international organizations.
Article Four
Mercenaries are not lawful combatants. If captured they are not
entitled to prisoner of war status.
Article Five
(Crimes of mercenarism and other crimes for which mercenaries
can be responsible)
A mercenary bears responsibility both for being a mercenary and for
any other crime committed by him as such.
Article Six
(National legislation)
Each contracting state shall enact all legislative and other measures
necessary to implement fully the provisions of the present Convention.
Article Seven
(Jurisdiction)
Each contracting State undertakes to bring to trial and to punish
any individual found in its territory who has committed the crime de-
fined in Article I of the present Convention, unless it hands him over




1. Any State in whose territory the crime of mercenarism has been
committed or of which the persons accused of the crimes defined in
Article I are nationals, can make a request for extradition to the State
holding the persons accused.
2. The crimes defined in'Article I being deemed to be common
crimes, they are not covered by national legislation excluding extradition
for political offences.
3. When a request for extradition is made by any of the States
referred to in paragraph 1, the State from which extradition is sought
must, if it refuses, undertake prosecution of the offence committed.
4. If, in accordance with paragraphs 1-3 of this article, prosecution
is undertaken, the State in which it takes place shall notify the outcome
of such prosecution to the State which had sought or granted extradi-
tion.
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Article Nine
(Judicial guarantees)
Every person or group brought to trial for the crime set out in
Article I is entitled to all the essential guarantees of a fair and proper
trial. These guarantees include:
the right of the defendant to get acquainted in his native language
with all the materials of the criminal case initiated against him, the right
to give any explanation regarding the charges against him, the right to
participate in the preliminary investigation of the evidence and during
the trial in his native language, the right to have the services of an
advocate, or defend himself if he prefers, the right to give by himself or
through an advocate testimony in his defence, to demand that his wit-
nesses be summoned and participate in their investigation as well as in
the investigation of witnesses for the prosecution.
Article Ten
(Mutual assistance for criminal proceedings)
The Contracting Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure
of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in re-
spect of any of the crimes defined in Article I of this Convention.
Article Eleven
(Duty of States to ensure effective punishment)
Every contracting State shall take all administrative and judicial
measures necessary to establish effective criminal punishment for per-
sons and groups guilty of crimes set out in Article I of this Convention.
In particular, the State where a trial takes place shall ensure that ef-
fective and adequate punishment shall be meted out to the guilty.
Article Twelve
(Settlement of disputes)
Any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the present
Convention shall be settled either by negotiation or by any Interna-
tional Tribunal or Arbitrator accepted by all the Parties concerned.
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